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Ubiquitous Computing, UbiComp, is a vision of embedding computing to 
every aspect of our day to day life. In ubiquitous computing, interaction 
among communicating entities exists in highly dynamic, large scale and 
failure prone environments. Publish/Subscribe interaction paradigm, 
Pub/Sub, can be used to decouple interacting entities in ubiquitous 
environments by delivering events based on users interests. 
 
In this scenario, securing events dissemination and protecting users’ privacy 
are essential requirements for ubiquitous applications. In this thesis, we 
propose an encryption key establishment scheme for encrypting 
disseminated events in ubiquitous Pub/Sub infrastructures. The proposed key 
establishment scheme considers the dynamism, scalability and failure 
tolerance issues of ubiquitous environments. More importantly, the 
generated encryption keys reflect multi level access control polices, which is 
important to enforce users’ privacy polices.  
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1.1 Overview 
Ubiquitous computing is a wide and significant vision to embed computing in 
our day to day life [1]. Ubiquitous application scenarios mainly depend on 
embedded systems, sensor nodes, and mobile nodes. This dependency results 
into two main features of ubiquitous environments, namely dynamism and 
failure prone [9]. In particular, communicating entities frequently enter and 
leave ubiquitous environments.  
 
Consequently, interaction among communicating entities in such environments 
should employ a suitable paradigm which complies with the features of 
dynamism and failure prone. Fully decoupling among communicating entities is 
considered as a suitable solution [9]. Publish/Subscribe, Pub/Sub, interaction 
paradigm, which is based on receiving subscriptions from users and 
asynchronously publishing matching events, is a pioneer proposal in providing 
fully decoupling among communicating entities [3]. This makes Pub/Sub a very 
suitable choice for ubiquitous infrastructures.  
 
Ubiquitous applications require the support of security to guard users’ 
information. Also, they require the support of privacy to provide access control 
to users’ information.  In turn, Pub/Sub based interaction in ubiquitous 
environments must be secured and supported by privacy aware mechanisms. A 
main aspect of supporting secured Pub/Sub interaction is the generation of 
encryption keys. This key generation process must be designed with special 
considerations to the above mentioned features of ubiquitous environments.  
 
In addition, as supporting security is a required underpinning for enforcing 
privacy, generated encryption keys should reflect the access control levels 
which are specified by privacy polices. Unifying security and privacy 
mechanisms is a trend in the recent Pub/Sub research for ubiquitous 
environments [4]. And it is the top level goal of this thesis. Next we state our 
problem definition. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
Securing event dissemination in Pub/Sub infrastructures for ubiquitous 
infrastructures must consider the dynamism and failure prone features in 
ubiquitous environments. These two features are aggregated with other feature 
to describe the volatile ubiquitous environment [9]. In this context, a very 
significant issue is the used encryption key generation mechanism. 
 
The main investigated problem by this thesis is the possibility of developing an 
encryption key generation mechanism, for secure Pub/Sub based interaction in 
ubiquitous environments, which is independent from the volatility of these 
environments. In addition, this key generation process must be privacy aware 
one, so that generated keys reflect the access levels specified by users’ privacy 
rules.  
 
Pub/Sub uses data structures for storing and maintaining relations among users’ 
subscriptions, i.e., subscription lattices. Inspired by a very recent and significant 
proposal of secure Pub/Sub event dissemination [4], we assume that 
subscription lattices of content based Pub/Sub is a suitable candidates as core 
data structures for designing a privacy aware key generation mechanism to 
secure Pub/Sub in ubiquitous environments.  
 
We define the problem of this thesis in points as follows: 
 
a. Can we utilize the subscription lattices in content based Pub/Sub to generate 
privacy aware encryption keys for Publish/Subscribe users? 
 
b. Is the proposed key generation mechanism compatible with the volatility of 
ubiquitous environments?  
 
c. Is the proposed key generation mechanism able to generate encryption keys 
which represent the specified access levels by privacy policies in ubiquitous 
environments?  
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1.3 Methodology  
In order to address the defined problem of this thesis, we follow two main steps. 
A relevant methodology is followed at each step.  
 
The first step is to design our proposed key establishment scheme.  In this step, 
we follow an incremental methodology. In particular, we start a design attempt 
with a set of assumptions, which considers the requirements of key 
establishment schemes for Publish/Subscribe infrastructures in ubiquitous 
environments; we extract these requirements during the literature review. The 
assumptions are about the used core data structure for creating the privacy 
aware encryption keys as well as the entity which acts as a key manager. We 
start with the simplest assumptions for the first design attempt, and then we 
may increment their complexity for the subsequent design attempts. 
 
In turn, we design a privacy aware key establishment scheme based on the 
current assumptions. Finally, we analyze the resulting scheme to evaluate how 
it meets our defined goals in the problem definition of the thesis. Based on the 
analysis we decide whether we have to move to another design attempt or not, 
and how we should start this next design attempt, if any. Consequently, in case 
of starting a new design attempt, we define a new set of assumptions for it. This 
process repeats until we reach the most suitable solution to our goals in the 
problem definition of the thesis. 
 
From the first step, we will have a set of significant candidate solutions. These 
solutions proceed to the second step, i.e. prototyping. Because, the work of this 
thesis is classified as technology led research in ubiquitous computing, i.e. as 
opposite to application lead research [5], developing a proof of concept is an 
essential step.  
  
Our methodology in this step is to start the implementation from an already 
existing implementation of the core data structures which we use to build the 
candidate key establishment scheme around. At the same time, we implement 
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our design at the lowest level operations so that we do not affect the original 
functionalities of the used data structures. 
 
Finally, we visualize the results of the prototyped key establishment schemes. 
We use results visualization as a helper validation and debugging tool. In 
addition, for solutions with high operational complexity, we define pass and fail 
test procedures to validate the correctness of the prototype with respect to 
specific correctness properties. 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis 
The contributions of this thesis can be defined in three points. Firstly, this thesis 
defines the view of users’ privacy dimensions [12], e.g. location and time, as 
attributes in Pub/Sub subscriptions lattices. This view is significant as a basis 
for privacy aware key establishment based on these subscription lattices.  
 
The second contribution of this thesis is the proposal of poset based key 
establishment. Poset is a subscription lattice which maintains complete 
coverage relations among subscriptions [8, 7]. The significance of this 
contribution comes from this completeness of poset. In particular, we define an 
extension to this proposal which can be a very significant routing mechanism 
for encrypted events, using the poset based generated keys, without affecting 
the working principle of content based routing, which requires the disclosing of 
the content of these events. 
 
Finally, we come to the third contribution, namely, forest based key 
establishment. Forest is a subscription lattice which is a poset derived data 
structure but with more efficient operations that those of poset [37, 38]. Briefly, 
forest based key establishment is compatible with the volatility in ubiquitous 
environments, which is achieved by minimal rate of using of key establishment 
and updating procedures. In addition, forest based key establishment is a 
clustered and localized mechanism, which makes it compatible to error prone 
ubiquitous environment.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
In the next chapter, chapter 2, we start by reviewing the Pub/Sub as an 
interaction middleware. Then, we review the ubiquitous environment, its 
features and its requirements for interaction middleware. Finally, we review 
Pub/Sub proposals to address two main requirements of ubiquitous applications, 
namely, supporting privacy and providing security.  
 
Afterwards, in chapter 3, we view the key establishment problem of this thesis 
as a secure group communications problem for large and dynamic groups [20], 
i.e., Pub/Sub subscribers groups in the ubiquitous environments. We review 
relevant proposals of group key management, including key establishment and 
efficient key distribution mechanisms.  
 
Then, in the rest of chapter 3, we review how security levels, which are ensured 
by inter-group key management schemes, can be mapped to privacy rules, 
which is a main design guide for our proposal. In addition, we review other 
design guides which should be considered for group key management schemes. 
Also, we specify which ones we consider and how we plan to consider them, 
and which we do not consider at all. 
 
In chapter 4, we start by the categorization of the privacy rules, this important 
for specifying the features of privacy rules which we consider for our first data 
structure assumption. Then, we move to our first design attempt, which is based 
on the trivial assumption of key establishment at the same entity which 
maintains privacy rules. The first design attempt is analyzed and the results are 
used to proceed to the second one, i.e., poset based key establishment. After 
analyzing the result of the second design attempt, we move to the third and the 
last design attempt, i.e., forest based key establishment. Finally, the analysis of 
our last design attempt shows its suitability as a solution for the defined 
problem in this thesis. 
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In this chapter, we define the context of the research in this thesis. Firstly, we 
define both the technological area, i.e. middleware and publish subscribe 
software infrastructures, and the application area, i.e. ubiquitous computing. 
Then, we connect both of them by reviewing the requirements of ubiquitous 
middleware and viewing them from the perspective of publish subscribe 
middleware.   
 
2.1 Middleware Infrastructures 
Middleware provides abstractions to hide the heterogeneity of distributed 
systems, which makes the distribution as transparent as possible [6]. This 
includes providing advanced coordination models as well as managing 
dependability and performance. Middleware infrastructures can be classified 
based on the coordination model they provide [6]. The first middleware class is 
the transactional middleware, which defines contracts to ensure consistent state 
transition of the distributed systems. A second class is the tuple-space based 
middleware, which makes use of a globally shared storage space that can be 
accessed by interacting entities for inserting, reading and removing tuples.  
 
Another middleware class is the remote procedure calling middleware. It allows 
interacting entities to invoke procedures remotely as if they are invoked locally, 
which makes it a significant interaction model. A natural evolution of the 
remote procedure calling middleware class is the object and component 
oriented middleware. Basically, it is a mapping of the object oriented and 
component based paradigm to a distributed environment.  
 
A fifth middleware class is the message-oriented middleware. It is a variation of 
the tuple-space based middleware. The difference is that tuples are implemented 
as messages and the globally shared space is implemented by distributed 
message-queues. An interacting node registers as a member in a message queue 
to receive messages. Another alternative to implement a shared space is to 
deliver messages by means of predicates, which is the work principle of publish 
subscribe middleware, Pub/Sub. In contrast to all the previously mentioned 
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classes of middleware, Pub/Sub provides fully decoupled interaction among 
interacting nodes [3]. This is more explained in the next section. 
 
2.2 Publish/Subscribe Middleware 
Publish Subscribe, Pub/Sub, is an interaction paradigm which has received a 
significant amount of interest from both research and industry [3]. Mainly, 
Pub/Sub gains its significance from providing loosely coupled interaction 
among communicating entities in large scale communication environments. As 
a result, Pub/Sub is a very suitable interaction paradigm for asynchronous, 
dynamic and failure prone communication environments such as mobile and 
ubiquitous infrastructures. 
 
2.2.1 Interaction in Publish/Subscribe  
Basically, a Pub/Sub interaction scenario includes publishers, subscribers, 
event service, events, and notifications [3]. Publishers are entities which 
produce information to reflect events happening at their side. Subscribers are 
entities which are interested in such events. Subscribers submit subscriptions to 
the event service to express their interests. It is the responsibility of the event 
service to deliver notifications about the subscribed events from the publishers’ 
side to the subscribers’ side.  
 
The event service is composed of a network of event routers/brokers, which are 
connected by means of communication network. Pub/Sub brokers are mainly 
discriminated into two categories, viz. terminal/local brokers and intermediate 
brokers [14]. Terminal/Local brokers are those brokers at the borders of the 
Pub/Sub brokers network/cloud. A subscriber/Publisher can access the event 
service via the Pub/Sub brokers which are local to it. On the other hand, 
intermediate brokers are more inner brokers in the Pub/Sub network/cloud and 
their main function is forwarding notifications. In figure.1, a Pub/Sub scenario 
is illustrated.  
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Fig.1. an example of Publish/Subscribe Interaction Scenario 
 
2.2.2 Interaction Decoupling in Publish/Subscribe  
Pub/Sub decouples publishers and subscribers at three dimensions, namely, 
time, space, and synchronization [3]. Firstly, at the time dimension, interacting 
entities do not have to be connected to event service at the same time to 
communicate. Secondly, for Space de-coupling, the publishers and the 
subscribers do not have references to each other. Also, they do not know how 
many entities of each side are involved in the interaction. Finally, from a 
synchronization point of view, publishing events or being notified about them 
doesn’t exist in the main flow of control of an interacting entity. The event 
notification service is responsible for storage and management of subscriptions 
and efficient delivery of events, which is essential for interaction decoupling the 
Pub/Sub. 
  10
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2.2.3 Variants of Publish/Subscribe 
Mainly, Pub/Sub has three main variants namely, topic based Pub/Sub, content-
based Pub/Sub, and type-based Pub/Sub [3]. In topic based Pub/Sub, a topic is 
used as an initialization argument in the delivered event and every topic is 
viewed as an event channel. Topic based Pub/Sub provides no intelligent 
interaction, because subscribers get all published events under the subscribed 
topic without any filtering.  
 
As an intelligent variant, content based Pub/Sub filters events based on their 
properties, e.g. Meta data associated with the event or the internal attributes of 
the data structures carrying the event. As a result, subscriptions take suitable 
forms which enable the filtering process. Usually, subscriptions take the string 
form to describe filtering constraints, which can be logically combined to have 
complex subscription patterns. In addition, it is possible to have events 
correlation or logical combinations of elementary events. 
 
A more structured variant is type based Pub/Sub. To deliver an event, it is 
enough that it complies with a template object. In addition, type based Pub/Sub 
is intelligent because matched events are not necessary to be the same as the 
templates, e.g. attributes should match except for those of null value. In the next 
section we introduce the Pub/Sub service which we start our proposal from it. 
 
2.2.4 SIENA: A Content Based Publish/Subscribe Service 
SIENA is a very significant proposed content based Pub/Sub service [8, 7]. The 
interaction in SIENA is similar to the reviewed Pub/Sub interaction scenario in 
section 2.2.1. From a high level perspective, publishers specify the events they 
may publish using advertisements. Subscribers specify events of their interest 
in terms of subscriptions. Publishers generate notifications about their events. 
In turn, SIENA, as the event service, delivers notifications to the target 
subscribers. 
 
SIENA is composed of a set of event servers [8, 7]. The number and the 
topology of the interconnected event servers may vary, depending on the 
Chapter 2                                                                                            Background 
  12
required configuration of the event service. A publisher or a subscriber may 
access the service via one event sever, which is referred to as access point.  At 
the end, all of the interacting entities in a Pub/Sub service communicate by a 
communication network, regardless of the exact physical details of this 
network.  
 
The function of forwarding subscriptions and notifications is done by the event 
servers, which can be interconnected in a number of topologies [8, 7]. They can 
be interconnected in a hierarchical topology, where a parent server receives all 
subscriptions from its children and it only sends notifications back to them. 
This is a natural extension to the centralized event service. Of course, the main 
advantage of this topology is that an entire subset of servers can join the 
network by just connecting their root servers to any connected server to the 
hierarchy. However, the main problem is the overloading of higher level 
servers. 
 
Alternatively, event servers can be connected by an acyclic peer to peer 
topology [8, 7], so that servers communicate with each other as peers. The 
server to server connections are non-directed arcs. The whole connection set is 
maintained as an acyclic graph. In figure.2, an example acyclic peer to peer 
event severs network is illustrated [8]. 
 
Different issues of advantages and disadvantages of this topology were 
investigated discussed [8], and a cyclic peer to peer variant is proposed. In 
addition, a hybrid approach of combining the acyclic peer to peer topology with 
the hierarchal topology is introduced. However, for the purpose of this thesis 
we assume that the acyclic peer to peer topology is the default configuration of 
the SIENA events servers’ networks.  
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Fig.2. an acyclic peer to peer Publish/Subscribe event servers network [8] 
 
Inside the event service [8, 7], advertisements are used to guide the event 
service so that it can efficiently route subscriptions towards the publishers, 
which will produce matching notifications to these subscriptions. On the 
opposite direction, subscriptions are used to route notifications from their 
publishers to their subscribers. In other words, both advertisements and 
subscriptions work together to avoid sending subscriptions to all servers. In 
particular, SIENA uses advertisements to identify the potential sources of 
events. Two variant of SIENA can be defined, viz. subscription based service, 
where only subscriptions form the semantics of the service, and advertisement 
based service, where only advertisements form the semantics of the service [8, 
7].  For the purpose of our work, we only consider the first variant, namely, the 
subscription-based service. 
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In SIENA, an event notification is defined as a set of attributes [8, 7]. And each 
attribute is a triple of name, type and value. An attribute is uniquely defined by 
its name. In figure.3, an example of event notification is illustrated [8]. An 
attribute type is defined from a limited set of data types, which include char, 
integer, and Boolean. In addition, operators, mainly for matching purposes, are 
defined by SIENA.  These definitions of data types and matching operators are 
mainly used for matching notifications against subscriptions, which are defined 
in terms of filters. A filter is defined in terms of a set of attribute names and 
types by applying constraints to their values. A pattern of interesting events can 
be defined by combining a set of filters. In fig.4, an example of event filter is 
illustrated [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3. an example of even notification [8] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4. an example of even filter [8] 
 
 
  14
Chapter 2                                                                                            Background 
  15
In this section, we reviewed Publish/Subscriber middleware as the used 
technology side of the research context of this thesis. Also, we introduced 
SIENA, the Pub/Sub content based service proposal which we start our 
proposal from. In the next section, we introduce ubiquitous computing, the 
application area of the proposal in this thesis. Moreover, we review the 
interesting characteristics of the ubiquitous environments, where the fully 
decoupling of interaction in Pub/Sub can be very suitable. 
 
2.3 Ubiquitous Computing 
Ubiquitous computing was proposed as a vision to spread computing as an 
essential part of day to day life [9, 1]. Computing devices are embedded in 
surrounding physical objects and places. The connection among this variety of 
appliances is done by means of communication networks, which are typically 
wireless networks. Controlling such physical objects and appliances may be 
done by various interaction devices, which may be mobile devices. However, a 
user may not be concerned with any control process. He even may not be aware 
of the existence of the surrounding computing environment while it is serving 
him.  
 
Research in ubiquitous computing focuses on small special purpose devices, 
special network protocols to communicate these devices, interaction 
infrastructures, possible ubiquitous applications, wireless communication, 
location and resource discovery, power consumption, security as well as 
privacy [2].  A more focused concept is pervasive computing, which is 
concerned with how people see mobile and wireless computing devices, how 
application are developed and deployed, and how ubiquitous infrastructures 
serve the pervasive environment [2]. The work of this thesis is focused at the 
ubiquitous infrastructure side. 
 
Next, we review a set of characteristics of ubiquitous environments which 
impose its significant challenges on designing software systems for these 
environments. 
 
Chapter 2                                                                                            Background 
  16
2.3.1 Characteristics of Ubiquitous Environments and Software Challenges  
In ubiquitous computing, software is required to work in our everyday 
applications, on failure prone hardware with limited resources, and in 
continuously dynamic environments [9]. These requirements result from two 
main characteristics of the ubiquitous systems. The first characteristic is the 
physical integration among resource constrained embedded and sensor nodes 
from one side and objects in the real world from another side. 
 
The second characteristic is the spontaneous interoperation, in ubiquitous 
environments, among units of software which can be services, clients, resources 
or applications [9]. In general, such software components are usually working 
on nomadic devices, which continuously come to/leave the environment. 
Moreover, the availability and features of a software component/unit may itself 
vary with time. For example, a software component in a spontaneous 
interaction may communicate with a set of other software components/units 
which may change their identities and functionalities with time in response to 
the surrounding environment.  
 
Similarly, this spontaneous interaction in ubiquitous environments applies to 
users and hardware. At a more general scope, spontaneous interoperation is 
defined by the Volatility Principle, a design principle which we must follow 
when designing any system for ubiquitous environments.   
 
The Volatility Principle 
“You should design ubicomp systems on the assumption that the set of 
participating users, hardware, and software is highly dynamic and 
unpredictable. Clear invariants that govern the entire system’s 
execution should exist” [9] 
 
This principle reflects the high dynamic nature of the ubiquitous environment, 
which is a main guide line followed by the work of this thesis. 
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Considering the two above mentioned characteristics of ubiquitous 
environments and the volatility principle, the design of ubiquitous software 
infrastructures should consider issues like adapting to dynamic environments, 
fault tolerance, and resources constrained devices [9]. In the next section, we 
review the requirements of ubiquitous middleware.  
 
2.3.2 Requirements of Ubiquitous Middleware 
At the middleware level of ubiquitous infrastructures, common requirements 
are imposed by different applications [10, 2].  These requirements include 
handling mobility of users and communicating nodes, the ability of self 
organizing and stabilizing to adapt with the dynamic and failure prone 
environment, the ability to handle device heterogeneity in the ubiquitous 
environments, and providing security to guard user data against unauthorized 
access or modification [10, 2]. In addition, these requirements include user 
intent awareness, context awareness and adaptation, delegation, high-level 
energy management, and managing privacy and trust [6]. For the purpose of 
this thesis, we focus on the requirements of providing security as well as 
privacy. 
 
Privacy and Trust 
In order to support different functionalities of ubiquitous applications, intensive 
management and distribution of user information is required [6]. Trusting the 
ubiquitous environment is a critical issue which should be considered at all 
levels, including the middleware level. From the users’ perspective, ensuring 
privacy is an essential requirement in order to avoid undesired use of their data. 
The work of this thesis considers protecting users’ privacy by means of suitable 
encryption schemes. 
 
Privacy Policies in ubiquitous Environments 
In ubiquitous environments, users should be able to specify policies to 
control the distribution of their information, e.g. location information 
[11]. Even if there are no assumptions of intended violation of the 
privacy rules, inadvertent violations are still possible. Software 
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infrastructures, e.g. Pub/Sub substrate, are responsible for enforcing the 
specified policies. 
 
An example of privacy policies is the context based information sharing, 
e.g. with respect to time and location. Another example is transforming 
the information of user location into anonymous forms for specific use 
cases, e.g. hiding the name of a user or abstracting its location inside a 
building [11]. Moreover, richer privacy policies include restricting the 
ability of users to delegate their rights to other users.  
 
Survivability and Security 
From a security perspective, there are two types of system survivability namely, 
survival by protection, SP, and survival by adaptation, SA [2]. As for SP, access 
control and encryption are used to protect applications from both accidental and 
malicious emerging harms. On the other hand, SA attempts to adapt the system 
to face the changing conditions. In this thesis, we focus on providing SP by 
means of encryption at the level of ubiquitous middleware. 
 
Security for Resource-Poor Devices 
In section 2.3.1, we mentioned that ubiquitous software infrastructures 
should consider the limited resources of the physically 
integrated/embedded computing devices. Such limitations have impact 
on the used security mechanisms [9]. For example, extremely resource 
poor devices may not be bale to perform public key encryptions. As a 
result, in such case, only symmetric key encryption is used.  Even if the 
computational resources allow using public key encryption [29], then 
using it must be minimized because its power consuming computations. 
This issue is a main guideline for this thesis. 
 
In the next section, we view these requirements of ubiquitous middleware from 
the perspective of Pub/Sub middleware. 
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2.4 Publish/Subscribe as a Ubiquitous Middleware 
Many of the mentioned requirements of ubiquitous middleware, in section 
2.3.2, are concerned with the used interaction paradigm. In this section, we 
review how these requirements are addressed by Pub/Sub infrastructures. Next, 
we review how privacy is supported in Pub/Sub infrastructures.  
 
2.4.1 Supporting Privacy in Publish/Subscribe Middleware 
In Pub/Sub, subscribers specify what events they want to receive. Oppositely, 
privacy policies enable publishers to specify who receive their information and 
under what terms [11]. At this point, two roles must be discriminated viz. 
anonymous collection of information and privacy policy controlled 
dissemination of events, which is the wide problem domain of this thesis.  
 
Anonymous Collection of Users’ Information 
Anonymous collection of users’ information requires querying these 
information considering issues like trust and delegation of rights. A very 
important example is the anonymous collecting of users’ location information. 
This is achieved by giving a user, who may be a Pub/Sub publisher, the right to 
choose how the event service can access his information [11]. For example he 
may specify that his information can be distributed only during specific hours in 
the day, e.g. work day hours, and even while he is in specific locations. 
 
However, a publisher does not have a default right to access any aggregated 
information by the service, which already includes his own information. It is the 
responsibility of the service administrator to delegate rights to interacting 
entities, including the ownership of event types, adding new event types, 
publishing events, subscribing to events, and even the ability to delegate access 
rights to other entities. Based on the delegated rights, interacting entities can 
perform actions. Enforcing these delegated rights affect the events 
dissemination in Pub/Sub in ubiquitous environments, which is discussed in 
section 2.4.2. 
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A more powerful tool that may be given to a user of an event service is the 
ability to specify the level at which his own information can be disclosed. This 
is provided by enforcing the concept of Information Precision [12]. This is an 
essential issue for privacy enforcement in ubiquitous environments. It should 
not be confused with information accuracy issues regarding the noise of the 
sensors in ubiquitous environment and their efficiency degradation. More 
specifically, Information Precision means that users can control their privacy by 
specifying the precision of disclosing their own information.  
 
As opposite to disclose/non-disclose privacy policies, information precision 
enables multilevel privacy policies [12]. For example, a user may specify that 
his location information can be only disclosed in terms of buildings names and 
not in terms of exact room numbers. At the end, specifying information 
precision uses precision scales, which may differ based on the types of 
information they represent. A general example of such scale from highest to 
lowest can be represented as follows:  
 
{Precise, Approximate, Vague, Undisclosed} [12] 
 
In ubiquitous applications, privacy is commonly concerned with the following 
set of personal information: 
 
{Identity, Location, Time, Activity, and Nearby people} [12] 
 
An example of applying the above mentioned precision scale to these types of 
information is illustrated by in table.1 [12]. 
 
To sum up, anonymous collection of users’ information functions as the front 
end of supporting privacy by Pub/Sub middleware, we move now to the back 
end, i.e. privacy policy controlled event dissemination. 
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Table.1.Normalized precision levels of personal information dimensions 
[12]  
 
 Identity 
Location 
Indoor/outdoor
Activity 
Nearby 
People 
Time 
Precise True name Room/Block Precise Names In Minutes 
Approximate Pseudonym 
Building/ 
District 
Categorical Roles Hours 
Vague Role Municipality 
Busy/ 
Not Busy 
Number Days 
Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed 
 
Privacy Policy Controlled Event Dissemination 
As we mentioned in the previous point, entities in a privacy aware Pub/Sub 
infrastructures interact with each other based on delegated rights. Also, these 
rights are affected by the ability of the users to control the precision at which 
their information is disclosed. In particular, a user affects the rights of other 
users by specifying his privacy policy. 
 
To specify the delegated rights to users, policy condition rules are defined [11]. 
These rules are logical predicates which include conditions applied to the 
allowed Pub/Sub action by different interacting entities. For example, a logical 
predicate may describe whether an entity is allowed to publish/subscribe to a 
specific event type. Once that entity attempts to perform a Pub/Sub action, e.g. 
subscribing to an event, the privacy aware infrastructure evaluates the relevant 
predicates, which results into a Boolean result. Based on that result, the entity 
may proceed or not in accomplishing the attempted action. An example of this 
process is shown in figure.5 [11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2                                                                                            Background 
 
Fig.5. Privacy Controlled Event Dissemination [11] 
 
In addition to applying condition rules to Pub/Sub operations, these rules may 
apply to any possible event attributes or external attributes [11]. These 
attributes may be privacy attributes like those we mentioned in the previous 
point of this section. For example, in a location aware ubiquitous environment, 
an event attribute can be the location of the user and an external attribute can be 
the time at which this location event is collected. A logical predicate of a 
condition rule specified by that user may include applied conditions to these 
two privacy attributes. 
 
To provide privacy policy controlled dissemination of events, a privacy aware 
Pub/Sub infrastructure must support two facilities, namely, the definition and 
evaluation of the privacy condition rules [13] and the provision of security 
underpinnings [11].  
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a. Definition and Evaluation of Privacy Rules 
The first side of providing this facility is supporting high level of 
expressiveness to rules building tools, so that they are flexible enough to 
describe a wide variety of privacy rules. The second side of this facility 
is supporting efficient evaluation of these privacy policy rules. A trade 
off between these two sides is required, since the higher the 
expressiveness the less the rules evaluation efficiency.  
 
A recent proposal which achieves the balance between efficiency and 
expressiveness is CPOL [13], a framework for policy evaluation. CPOL 
employs both an efficient evaluation mechanism as well as caching 
mechanism. Also, it provides the expressiveness levels similar to those 
provided by database engines like MySql. For the performance, CPOL 
goes higher by six orders of magnitude than MySql, which has a 
throughput of only few thousands queries per second. CPOL is designed 
to serve in large-scale infrastructures, with a size of 10,000 or more 
users. 
 
Building and Evaluation of policy rules has already received a 
significant amount of research efforts and reached a good level of 
performance. This functionality is out of the scope of the work of this 
thesis.  
 
b. Security Enforced Privacy Policy  
As we mentioned above, it is important that security underpinnings 
support privacy policy controlled event dissemination. This facility is 
required to enforce privacy in entrusted environments [11]. The 
situation gets more complicated in dynamic large scale ubiquitous 
environments, where spanning several administrative domains requires 
addressing special security considerations [14].  
 
For more analysis, we view the problem of enforcing the privacy policy 
condition rules as an access control problem. For a Publish/Subscribe 
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infrastructure in a ubiquitous environment, access control functionalities 
can be done to specialized entities [14].  This decision can achieve 
efficiency, by not overloading the brokers of the event service, as well 
as limiting the trust assumptions [15], which we discuss in section 2.4.3.  
 
At the same time, to provide encryption of disseminated events, as a 
security underpinning for enforcing privacy policy, specialized entities 
are required to establish encryption keys, which is the main focus of our 
work in this thesis. A very reasonable solution is to move both 
functionalities, namely, access control and key establishment to the 
same entity in the network. In a security enabled Pub/Sub substrate, 
these entities may be called key managers [16, 14]. Consequently, such 
decision can be a first step towards achieving the long term goal of 
unifying privacy mechanisms and security mechanisms in Pub/Sub 
infrastructures [11, 4], which is a goal of our work in this thesis too. 
 
In this section we reviewed how Pub/Sub infrastructures can support privacy in 
ubiquitous environment. Two main sides were reviewed, namely, the 
anonymous collection of users data and the privacy controlled event 
dissemination. At the end of this section, we came to the point were security 
underpinnings are required to enforce users privacy rules.  
 
In our proposal, we focus on encrypting events in privacy aware manner. In 
turn, we have to review how encrypting events in Pub/Sub may affect the 
working principle of content based Pub/Sub, i.e., routing events based on their 
disclosed content. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4.2 Event Encryption for Content Based Publish/Subscribe 
In Pub/Sub infrastructures, an event is encrypted using encryption keys which 
are managed by a set of entities, i.e. key managers [16, 14]. A publisher, a 
subscriber, or an event router/broker can operate on events or events attributes 
only if it has the appropriate encryption keys. Any of such entities must 
authenticate itself to the key managers to receive encryption keys. This is an 
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issue of both trust and authorization, which we discuss in section 2.4.3. In 
addition to their main task of managing encryption keys, key managers control 
access to these keys [14]. 
 
In such large scale and multi-domain environments, like ubiquitous 
environments, Pub/Sub brokers in some administrative domain may not be 
allowed to access the contents of the events from other domains [14]. At the 
same time, as we reviewed about content based Pub/Sub in sections 2.2.3 and 
2.2.4, these brokers have the duty of routing events, which requires disclosing 
the content of events. As a result, a question mark originates about how an 
event should be encrypted to enable brokers to make content based routing 
decisions. Answering this question has received a significant amount of 
research. In this section, we review two proposals with significant 
contributions.  
 
Multilevel Event Encryption and Event Type Based Routing 
In the first proposal [14], an event type is given a unique global identifier [15], 
which is used by key managers to generate encryption keys for this particular 
event type. When an authorized publisher wants to publish an event, it registers 
itself to an authorized local broker. Then, the publisher submits the event to this 
broker. In turn, the local broker uses the encryption key, which is associated 
with the type of the received event, to encrypt the entire event. Afterwards, the 
local broker forms a message which contains both the encrypted event as well 
as its unique global event type identifier. Finally, the authorized local broker 
pushes the event in the network towards subscribing intermediate brokers, 
which some of them may be authorized to see the contents of the event or not.  
 
Once it receives an encrypted event message, an authorized intermediate/local 
broker extracts the combined unique global identifier of the event type. The 
broker uses this identifier to specify which of the encryption keys it has is 
associated with this event type. It’s important to note that the authorized broker 
has already got this encryption key of this event type from the key managers. 
After the authorized broker decrypts the event, it uses the disclosed event 
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attributes to make a content based routing decision. Finally the broker forwards 
the received encrypted event message further into the Pub/Sub broker network.  
 
Oppositely, once an unauthorized broker receives an encrypted event message, 
it will forward it only based on the combined unique global identifier of the 
event type.  In other words, it forwards all the relieved events of the same type 
to all subscribers/brokers who are interested in that event type, without making 
any intelligent content based routing decisions. This is a very significant 
limitation of this event encryption scheme. However, this scheme has the 
advantage of doing only one encryption operation at the start of the event 
dissemination. A similar concept to this unique global event type identifier 
based forwarding is referred to as Token Based Forwarding [4]. It is again an 
event type representative for routing encrypted events.  
 
In addition, this event encryption proposal defines attribute level encryption 
[14]. It defines a globally unique attribute identifier for each attribute in a given 
event type. This identifier is used by the key managers to generate an 
encryption key specifically for encrypting the values of this attribute. 
Encryption at the attribute level introduces higher overhead. However, it 
enables users to define more expressiveness access control on their events at the 
attributes level.  
 
In attribute based encryption [14], an event message includes the globally 
unique identifier of the event type. Again this identifier is used for event 
forwarding at the unauthorized brokers. As a result, again no intelligent content 
based routing decisions are done at the unauthorized brokers. Again, the only 
advantage is the given expressiveness to the user to define his access control 
polices at the attribute level. 
 
In an event message, the globally unique identifiers of encrypted attributes are 
included. Authorized brokers use these identifiers to know the proper key which 
they will use to decrypt the attribute values in a received encrypted event 
message. Again, authorized brokers have already got these keys form the key 
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managers. Consequently, they can make intelligent content based routing 
decisions using the decrypted event attributes. In the next section, we review 
another significant proposal for attribute based event encryption. It defines the 
possibility of encrypting some attributes of the event and disclosed others, for 
making content based routing decisions using them. 
 
Selective Attribute Based Event Encryption 
In another significant event encryption proposal [16], an assumption of not 
trusting the broker network at all is made. At the same time, without using the 
globally unique identifier of event types proposed, of the previously discussed 
proposal, an encryption of the entire event is excluded [16]. In general, 
matching and routing based on an entirely encrypted event is very difficult to 
achieve in a practical way. In particular, suggested techniques to perform 
computations on the encrypted data can not be practically implemented [16]. 
Also, this may require modification to existing matching and routing 
algorithms.    
 
Consequently, disclosing some attributes of an encrypted event to make routing 
decisions is required. At this point, a very important note comes to the image 
which states that: “Only selected parts of the events need to be confidential, 
matching and routing should be accomplished without these parts” [16]. For 
example, in a ubiquitous location-aware service, the attribute of user’s identity 
can be disclosed while the value of his location or the value of the time at which 
he was in that location may not be disclosed. As a result, routing can be done 
based on the disclosed attribute, i.e. user identity. This is more intelligent than 
making routing decisions only using the identifiers of the event types, as 
discussed in the previous proposal. 
 
In turn, we need to make use of a selective approach to select which attributes 
of an event to encrypt and which to disclose [16]. In particular, two main issues 
arise from such selective approach. Firstly, a limitation of the content based 
routing capability is very likely to exist. This is because the encrypted attributes 
can not be used for making content based routing decisions. Secondly, a 
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question mark arises about the forms of confidentiality categories or 
descriptions which can be used to describe the selection process of attributes for 
encryption. 
 
In this section, we discussed two significant proposals for event encryption in 
Pub/Sub middleware. The most important issue for both of them is how event 
encryption affects the content based routing of events. Basically, two main 
approaches of event encryption are proposed, i.e. event based encryption and 
attribute based encryption. In the proposed solution in this thesis, we follow the 
event based encryption approach. For both approaches, the role of key 
management is delegated to trusted entities, e.g. Pub/Sub brokers, which is a 
matter of trusting these entities. In the next section we review trust in Pub/Sub 
infrastructures.  
 
2.4.3 Trust in Dynamic Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures  
From section 2.4.2, we can conclude that two issues of the event encryption 
process are related to trusting entities in a Pub/Sub infrastructure. The first one 
is the allocation of the key management functionality. The second one the 
classification of Pub/Sub brokers into authorized or unauthorized with respect 
to the ability to access the contents of an event. More importantly, this trust 
issue gets more complicated when we consider the continuously dynamic 
Pub/Sub substrate in ubiquitous environments [17].  
 
Dynamism in Ubiquitous Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures 
In ubiquitous environments, a Pub/Sub substrate is required to be flexible to 
provide better applicability as well as to reduce the required management 
efforts [17]. This flexibility requirement is even strengthen by the need of both 
collaboration and fast events dissemination in the ubiquitous environments. 
Moreover, the common assumption of statically or manually managed topology 
of notification service brokers is very clear to fail for a Pub/Sub substrate 
functioning in a ubiquitous environment. Additionally, usage pattern in these 
environments are highly dynamic. Together all of these reasons form the source 
of dynamism in a Pub/Sub infrastructure in a ubiquitous environment.  
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For example, in an e-home scenario [17], all networked device may interact 
thought a Pub/Sub substrate. According to the volatility principle, which is 
reviewed in section 2.3.1, nodes used by users at home continuously join and 
leave the network. Additionally, there is no assumption about the existence of a 
skilled administrator to maintain the system configuration. As a result, the 
Pub/Sub substrate must be able to adapt itself to different usage patterns and 
different failures. Consequently, the need of dynamic Pub/Sub substrates in 
ubiquitous environments is a must, which in turn moves the issue of trust to a 
higher complexity level. 
 
Back to the trust issue, it is clear that in a static Pub/Sub substrate topology we 
can depend on building trust domains [14]. On the other hand in topologically 
dynamic Pub/Sub substrates, we need to enforce access control and 
confidentiality among all involved entities, including Pub/Sub brokers. This 
requirement implies the mentioned two issues at the beginning of this section, 
i.e., the allocation of the key management functionality and the authorization to 
access events. 
 
Trust and Authorization of Event Access in Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures 
Looking at authorization as a result of trust, we review a significant proposal 
which joins the two concepts, namely, Role Based Access Control, RBAC [18]. 
In this proposal, roles are defined and can be activated by interacting entities in 
the Pub/Sub substrate. In RBAC, roles function as a security basis for 
controlling publications, subscriptions, and other related operations. Role based 
access control is very suitable to a continuously evolving and dynamically 
changing Pub/Sub substrate. RBAC defines the concept of event type owner, 
which are assumed to be trusted by a Public Key Infrastructure, PKI. This is a 
very small scale trust assumption which RBAC starts with. 
 
Based on the trust in type owners, they are authorized to have control over the 
policy which applies to accessing their own event types. At the same time, a 
type owner does not have to be a publisher of this type. Consequently, even if 
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there are no publishers or subscribers in the Pub/Sub substrate, registered event 
types along with their event owners always exist. This is quite suitable to a 
Pub/Sub substrate in a ubiquitous environment. As for an event type, it can be 
defined in terms of its name and its attributes [18]. Event type definitions are 
kept in a logical event respiratory, where they are organized in an inheritance 
hierarchy. The storage enables event types to be checked at publishing time and 
the hierarchy enables multilevel access control. 
 
In RBAC, roles relate principals and privileges [18]. Moreover, RBAC states 
that the policy which shapes such roles must be dynamic and loosely coupled 
from the protected software itself. In an RBAC system, roles are activated by an 
entity in the Pub/Sub network to make use of their privileges. An entity must be 
authenticated before being able to access any roles. An entity may activate more 
than one role. A collection of activated roles is defined as a session, which 
facilitates the simultaneous management of these roles. RBAC may require the 
activation of some roles by an entity to be able to proceed with activating 
further roles.  
 
More specifically, subscribers and publishers can determine what events they 
are permitted to subscribe to /publish based on the specified access policy by 
the type owner as well as the credentials provided by them [18]. This assumes 
that at least the local brokers to these publishers and subscribers are trusted by 
the type owners. For the credentials which can be used to design access control 
policy, there are two broad categories, viz. authentication and capabilities. Also, 
other factors can be included in the credentials, e.g. user’s location. At this 
point we have two important notes; firstly, the scope of trust has been widened 
to include local brokers in the Pub/Sub event service. Secondly, the trusted 
event type owner gave access authorization to publishers and subscribers. These 
two notes are more discussed as follows: 
 
a. Fully Trusted Broker Network 
As we mentioned above, RBAC defines event types as well as their 
owners. This definition targets to make few extra steps for publishers 
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and subscribers to be able to operate on a registered event type. In turn, 
access control overhead is lowered as much as possible. Moreover, 
RBAC targets to keep access control presence as hidden as possible to 
publishers and subscribers.  
 
From the overhead point of view, a special consideration is given to 
publishing events, since this process is usually more frequent in 
Pub/Sub than the process of subscribing events. In turn, RBAC aims to 
make access control overhead per event publication as low as possible. 
RBAC achieves this by trusting brokers in the Pub/Sub substrate. This 
trust assumption enables local brokers to handle the security checks for 
them to lower access control overhead [18].  
 
b. Authorization of Event Access 
As mentioned above, in RBAC different entities in the Pub/Sub 
substrate must provide the proper credentials to access a specific event 
type. One important category of credentials is defined in terms of 
assigned capabilities interacting entities [14]. In particular, event type 
owners grant authorization capabilities to entities in a Pub/Sub substrate 
by granting authorization certificate with specific access rights [15]. If 
this certificate allows an entity to delegate its own rights to other 
entities, then this authorized entity can grant authorization certificates to 
other entities. And this process repeats. Finally an event type owner can 
from a certificate chain to decide whether an entity is allowed to 
perform some action or not. 
 
Consequently, if an entity is allowed to access a specific event type, 
then it is allowed to access its encryption keys. Additionally it is 
important to mention that the capabilities assigned to a 
publisher/subscriber must be assigned to its local broker in the Pub/Sub 
substrate [18, 14], because local brokers are the access point of this 
client to the broker network [16, 15, 14]. 
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To sum up, the assumption of fully trusted brokers can not be always realistic. 
Additionally, as we mentioned in section 2.4.2, access control must be enforced 
by confidentiality, which requires encryption. In turn, a higher level of 
authorization is required to define the previously mentioned key managers. 
These two issues are reviewed in the next point. 
 
Limited Trust in Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures 
In a ubiquitous environment with a large and dynamic Pub/Sub substrate, it not 
realistic to always assume full trust in all brokers [16, 18]. This is because 
malicious brokers may exist in an infrastructure which spans different 
administrative domains. Basically there are two main approaches to define trust 
in Pub/Sub brokers. The first approach is to assume that these brokers have 
different levels of trustworthiness [18]. This approach allows an event owner to 
use a trusted sub-graph of the whole Pub/Sub network graph to serve its own 
event type. The second approach is to assume completely entrusted broker 
network [16]. This approach is supposed to work only with the selective 
attribute based encryption proposal, which is reviewed in section 2.4.2. 
 
a. Partially Trusted Broker Network 
In this approach, the authorization of certain brokers is restricted so that 
they are not allowed to serve certain event types [18].  Such restriction 
is specified using the associated access control policy rules with this 
event type, which is defined by the event type owner or a separate 
policy manager entity. To specify which brokers are allowed to serve a 
given event along its way from a publisher to a subscriber; trust in 
brokers is distributed through the Pub/Sub network [18].   
 
It is noticed that a broker can judge only neighbouring brokers, e.g. their 
performance. By utilizing this notice, a web of trust is build to span the 
sub-graph of the Pub/Sub brokers’ network with represents the 
authorized brokers to serve a given event type. In particular, certificate 
chains are used to form this web of trust. Each broker is assumed to hold 
what is called an appointment certificate.  
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An event type owner signs the certificates of the brokers which it trusts, 
and which are connected to it. In turn, these brokers sign the certificates 
of their neighbour brokers, which they trust, and so on. In addition, a 
publisher/subscriber has a trusted root certificate for event type owners, 
so that it can verify whether a local broker is authorized to 
publish/deliver a given event type from/to it.  
 
b. Totally Entrusted Broker Network 
This approach assumes that a publisher/subscriber may not trust the 
broker network [16]. The main notice which this approach focuses on is 
that publisher/subscriber only deals with border brokers, i.e., no direct 
contact among publishers and subscribers.  This notice is utilized so that 
no security associations between publishers and subscribers are 
required. 
 
In particular, a technique called proxy re-encryption is used to transform 
packages from being encrypted using publishers' public key into being 
encrypted with subscribers' public key [16]. This is done while assumes 
adversary access to the traffic within the broker network as well as the 
traffic between publisher and subscribers and the Pub/Sub network.  
 
From trust point of view, an event type owner can allocate the role of proxy re-
encryption [16], and the role of key management, to only a trusted entity [14]. 
This party can be a trusted third party or a member in the owner group of this 
event type. This is done for each individual event type, and this entity is 
responsible for generating encryption keys, refreshing them when necessary, 
and delivering them to all concerned entities. 
 
Furthermore, the entity which performs the key management functionality may 
consist of a group of brokers [14]. This can be done to achieve this functionality 
in a distributed fashion of shared secret [16]. And in a topologically dynamic 
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Pub/Sub substrate, in a ubiquitous environment, such key group may 
occasionally change. In turn, a higher level of trust must be supported.  
 
In particular, when a new node wants to join the key managers group, then a 
responsible node, which have the highest degree of trust and which is referred 
to as the key group manager must check if that new node is authorized to join 
the group. This is important to keep trust in the key managers group [14]. 
 
In this section, we reviewed how the trust issue is addressed in Pub/Sub 
infrastructures. Firstly, we started by reviewing the special feature of dynamism 
in ubiquitous Pub/Sub infrastructures, which complicates handling trust in these 
environments. Then, we reviewed a significant proposal which links trust to 
authorization of event access in Pub/Sub infrastructures [14]. It starts by 
assuming a very tight trust scope, in only the event type owner and ends by 
widening it to the whole Pub/Sub broker network. In addition, it defines the 
means by which authorized entities can be discriminated.  
 
Finally we reviewed two proposals with more limited trust assumptions in the 
broker network. From the perspective of this thesis, we assume a fully trusted 
Pub/Sub brokers’ network. In addition, the generated keys by our proposed 
scheme can also used for selective attribute based encryption to support totally 
entrusted Pub/Sub brokers’ network. Also, we assume the existence of some 
access control entity which is responsible for authenticating interacting entities 
for authorized access. The details of this issue r out of the scope of this thesis. 
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2.5 Summary: The Scope of Thesis  
In this chapter, we reviewed the Pub/Sub middleware. We reviewed SIENA, a 
content based Pub/Sub event service which we start our work from. In addition, 
we reviewed the ubiquitous environment and its requirements at the middleware 
level.  And finally, we viewed these requirements from the perspective of 
Pub/Sub infrastructures.   
 
From the perspective of this thesis, SIENA is the starting point of our work; we 
reviewed it in section 2.2.4, after a very essential introduction to Pub/Sub in the 
rest of section 2.2. Also, the characteristics of ubiquitous environments are very 
essential for our work. These characteristics have been aggregated by the 
volatility principle, which we reviewed in section 2.3.1. In addition, we focus 
on providing privacy aware encryption in ubiquitous Pub/Sub infrastructures. 
This is to comply with the two emphasized requirements of ubiquitous 
middleware which we reviewed in section 2.3.2. 
 
Also, we reviewed how current Pub/Sub proposals address users’ privacy. In 
particular, in section 2.4.1, we reviewed how privacy rules can be described and 
how they are used to control event dissemination. At the beginning of our 
proposal, in section 4.1, we use this review to make design assumptions. Also, 
this review is behind a starting point of our proposal, which is viewing privacy 
variables in terms of hierarchies. However, the way of defining and evaluating 
privacy rules are out of the scope of this thesis. 
 
Then, in section 2.4.2, we reviewed two main approaches for encrypting events 
for content based Pub/Sub, namely, event based encryption and attribute based 
encryption, our proposal follows the first one. Finally, in section 2.4.3, we 
reviewed the issue of trust in Pub/Sub infrastructures. We assume a fully trusted 
Pub/Sub brokers network. Also, our key establishment proposal can be used for 
selective attribute based encryptions in totally entrusted brokers’ network. 
However, providing access control and providing certification for the purpose 
of trust verification are out of the scope of this thesis.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Secure Group Communication in 
Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures 
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In this chapter, we start by defining the problem of this thesis as a secure group 
key establishment problem at the Pub/Sub last mile. And for an efficient 
solution of this problem, we review the possible ways of efficient group key 
distribution, considering the volatility of the ubiquitous environment and its 
large size subscribers groups. Secondly, we define another perspective of 
securing delivered events, which is the concept of security levels. This concept 
introduces the requirement of encrypting the same event using different keys to 
reflect different security levels. 
 
Thirdly, we review a set of design guides which should be considered for 
designing group key establishment schemes in ubiquitous environments. 
Combined with this review, we specify which of these factors we consider, and 
how we plan to consider them, and which we do not. Finally, we review a 
proposal of clustered group key establishment, which is the main architectural 
approach behind our proposal.  
 
3.1 Group Communication in Publish/Subscribe Infrastructures 
Client-server applications employ point-to-point data delivery, which is known 
as unicasting. In contrast, when it’s required to deliver data from one or more 
sender(s) to many receivers, multicasting is used as an underlying efficient 
communication substrate. This type of communication is referred to as group 
communication [19]. For Pub/Sub based interaction in ubiquitous environments, 
group communication exists when data is disseminated from a broker to 
neighbour brokers. Also, it exists at the Pub/Sub last mile, where a 
terminal/local broker propagates a received event to interested subscribers 
groups.   
 
Multicasting at the Pub/Sub last mile differs from multicasting inside the 
Pub/Sub brokers’ network. In particular, the size of the receiver group and the 
dynamism of its membership are the reasons of this difference. At the Pub/Sub 
last mile the number of the members in the receiver group is much higher and 
the receiver group membership changes in a more frequent rate [20].  
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Consequently, the problem of securing communication at the Pub/Sub last mile 
in ubiquitous environments can be defined as a special case of the secure group 
communication problem [20, 21]. The special considerations are the larger 
groups’ sizes and the dynamic membership, which are under the main focus of 
this thesis. 
 
3.2 Secure Group Communication at the Publish/Subscribe Last 
Mile 
A trivial solution to secure the event delivery from a Pub/Sub broker to the 
interested subscribers group may be defined in terms of point to point security, 
i.e. between the local broker and each client. Accordingly, whenever a 
subscriber wants to subscriber to an event; the trusted local broker authenticates 
this subscriber and establishes a session individual symmetric key to share with 
it [20, 19]. Then, the established key is used to for encrypting the subscribed 
events, which are sent from the broker to the client using unicasting. However, 
such solution does not scale for dynamic and large size groups of subscribers, 
which is a typical feature in ubiquitous environments. 
 
Another alternative is to use broadcast encryption [20]. This approach requires 
using a large number of encryption keys for large broadcast messages. In 
addition, the coalition among unprivileged users can decrypt the information. 
Moreover, by lowering the number of required keys for long broadcast, it’s 
allowed to a fraction of unprivileged users to be able to decrypt the message. 
Consequently, both individual encryption and broadcast encryption are not 
suitable for the purpose of encrypting multicast events messages [20]. In turn, 
we may consider using group key encryption to perform only one encryption 
operation on an event before sending it to all subscribers. As a result, 
multicasting can be easily used to deliver encrypted events instead of using 
unicasting or broadcasting. 
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3.2.1 Group Key Establishment for Publish/Subscribe Subscribers Groups 
Subscribers can be grouped based on the events they are interested in. These 
interests are dynamically changing, which makes establishing static secure 
groups a non-practical solution from the perspective of security management. 
This is completely not suitable for the very large numbers of subscribers, 
especially in a case like ubiquitous environments. Dynamic establishment of 
secure groups is the practical choice for this case [20]. In turn, we have to 
choose a suitable group key establishment scheme. 
 
Group key establishment protocols can be divided into two main categories viz. 
key distribution protocols, which is mainly a centralized key management 
scheme, and key agreement protocols [20, 22]. For the first category, one party 
generates or obtains secret keys and transfers them to other parties. For the 
second category, two or more communicating parties contribute information to 
jointly establish the shared secret keys. This is done in away which does not 
allow entities outside the target group to reveal any information about the 
shared secrets. In general, key agreement protocols have more computational 
cost than the key distribution schemes. In addition, key agreement protocols are 
mainly designed for the cases when there is a lack of trusted platform. 
Contrarily, in Pub/Sub infrastructures, the brokers’ network can be used to 
provide such platform. Consequently, group key distribution schemes are more 
relevant for our purpose of securing last mile event dissemination [20].  
 
3.2.2 Group Key Distribution and Updating 
On the other hand, to keep the subscribers updated with their group key we 
have to consider the frequent subscribe/unsubscribe operations, i.e. the frequent 
join/leave operations, by these subscribers, as group members [20, 19]. 
Updating the group key after every join and leave may result into higher 
overhead of session establishment than the overhead of unicast session 
establishment. Even if a trusted local Pub/Sub broker updates a newly joining 
subscriber with the currently used group key, which is not secure, when a 
subscriber leaves the subscribers group, a newly created group key must be 
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communicated by means of unicasting to all other group members. This process 
does not scale to large size groups. 
 
Consequently, the issue of updating the group key of a subscribers group can be 
defined as a problem of frequent key changes for a very large group [20, 19], 
which is a typical case for our volatile and large size groups of interacting 
entities in ubiquitous environments. We have to consider the scalability of key 
distribution [23]. The cost of group key establishment is relevant to the group 
size. To achieve scalability, decoupling of the group size form the costs of the 
key establishment should be a design requirement for the key establishment 
scheme.  
 
A possible solution may be defined by decomposing a large group of 
subscribers into many subgroups and using a hierarchy of security agents to 
manage the keys different subgroups at different levels of the hierarchy. An 
example of this approach is reviewed in this section. Even in the case of key 
establishment by a trusted third party, using hierarchical key distribution 
architectures is also possible [23]. In our work, this trusted third party is a 
trusted local Pub/Sub broker. In our future work, we map scalable key 
distribution network [23] to the Pub/Sub broker network, while in the current 
version of our work, we consider using another solution, i.e. key hierarchies. 
An example of such solution is reviewed in this section.  
 
Subgroups Hierarchies for Efficient Group Key Distribution 
A typical example of large and highly dynamic networking environment is 
large size ad hoc networks. With the special scalability requirement in such 
case, hierarchal arrangement of geographically scattered mobile nodes is 
proposed as a scalable key management scheme [24]. In particular, the 
scalability problem is solved by partitioning the communication devices into 
subgroups. Subgroups are organized into a hierarchy. Among the nodes in a 
subgroup a leader is elected. A level in the hierarchy is called a tier or a layer. 
An example hierarchy of security agents is illustrated in figure.6.  
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group leader generates 
e subgroup key and distributes it to a group member by encrypting it using a 
Fig.6. Key Distribution in Subgroups Hierarchy [24] 
 
For each layer, a secret key is defined; this key is hold by the members of the 
nodes hierarchy which are members of subgroups in that layer [24]. This key is 
generated by a key server whenever there is a need to refresh it, i.e. a node 
joins/leaves the layer.  In addition, each subgroup has its own subgroup key, 
which is hold by only the subgroup members. The sub
th
secret key which it shares with that particular member.  
 
When a new node joins the group, it is joined to one of the subgroups at the 
lowest layer of the hierarchy [24]. Contrarily, when a current member node 
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p members by 
ncrypting it using the previously generated subgroup key. Such approach is 
f our current proposal. We 
ainly consider another approach for efficient group key distribution, i.e. using 
nts the group key. This set of keys is defined as subgroup keys 
hich the subscriber belongs to. These keys are used for scalable and efficient 
leaves the group it’s removed from all the subgroups at all layers. For both 
cases, the leader of a subgroup with a membership change obtains a new 
subgroup key and sends it to its subgroup members, by means of unicasting. 
Then, for any affected layer, a new layer key is generated and the subgroup 
leader, at the higher layer, multicasts this key to its subgrou
e
scalable for key distribution to high dynamic large size groups.  
 
From the perspective of this thesis, we consider the possibility of using 
subgroups hierarchies only as improvements o
m
keys hierarchies. Next, we review this approach. 
 
Keys Hierarchies for Efficient Group Key Distribution 
A different approach of efficient key distribution for dynamic and large size 
groups is defined by generating keys hierarchies [19]. It assumes the existence 
of a trusted key server, in the context of this thesis it can be a trusted local 
Pub/Sub broker, which generates and securely distributes keys to subscribers. In 
particular every subscriber has an individual key, which is only shared with the 
key server. At the same time, a group key is shared by the key server and all the 
subscribers.  This key is used for the secure delivery of events to interested 
subscribers groups. In addition a key graph is defined. From this key graph, a 
subscriber is given a set of other keys which exist in the graph along the path 
from a leaf node, which represents its own individual key, to the root node, 
which represe
w
key updates. 
 
An example of a key hierarchy is viewed in figure.7 [19]. When a subscriber 
represented by node u9 subscribes, i.e. joins the group, the key server generates 
a new subgroup key, i.e.k789, to replace k78 and a new group key, i.e. k1-9, to 
replace k1-8. Then, the key server distributes k1-9 to subscribers from u1, u2 and 
u3 (u4, u5 and u6), encrypting it using the sub group key k123 (k456). Also it 
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tions in this case, only six operations are required. 
uch solution should be scalable to large and dynamic subscribers groups in a 
generated keys by our proposed scheme. Next, we review how 
ey hierarchies were proposed for efficient group key distribution at Pub/Sub 
ach particular event [20]. The key tree will be 
constructed for each join/leave event of the subscribers group, a process with 
ent. The cost of this approach 
epends on the cost of the search process. A more improved approach is 
lish group keys. In this thesis, we minimize this 
ependency by using a key server for key establishment and key hierarchies for 
fficient key distributions.  
distributes both k1-9 and the k789 to subscribers u7 and u8 using their old 
subgroup key u78. Finally, the key server distributes k1-9 and k789 to u9 by 
encrypting them using the individual key of u9. As a result instead of doing 
thirteen encryption opera
S
ubiquitous environment.  
 
From the perspective of this thesis, we use key hierarchies for efficient 
distribution of 
k
last mile [20]. 
 
Keys Hierarchies at the Publish/Subscribe Last Mile 
Key hierarchies provide an efficient approach to achieve scalable and secure 
key distribution for dynamic groups [19, 20]. A trivial suggestion to apply them 
for secure event multicasting to interested subscribers is to form a key tree for 
the subscribers group of e
re
a high computational cost.  
 
An alterative approach is to construct a full key tree which represents the whole 
set of subscribers for all events [20]. When delivering an event, the key tree will 
be searched to find the smallest subset of intermediate encryption keys which 
cover all the subscribers interested in this ev
d
achieved by means of group key caching [20]. 
 
To sum up, we notice that key establishment mechanisms mainly depend on the 
group membership to estab
d
e
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Fig.7. a node joins and leaves a group in a key hierarchy [19] 
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nd just encrypting a specific event for secure event delivery. 
 particular, it is found that different levels of encryption for the same event 
 such inter-group communication, 
hich directly applies to ubiquitous environments, is a location service where 
ers in a target group should be able to recover location data at 
pecific security levels which the rest of communicating nodes are prohibited 
to 
ccept a subscription from a user only based on his interest. Such subscription 
ider other factors which affect 
In the next section we review a very important concept, i.e. security levels. This 
concept goes beyo
In
are required [25]. 
 
3.3 From Security Levels to Privacy Rules 
An important perspective of secure group communication is the key generation 
and distribution for secure inter-group communication. Typically, nodes are 
divided into multiple groups and traffic exists both within the same group and 
among different groups [25]. An example of
w
users’ locations are shared with other users.  
 
In such environment, receiver nodes may be divided into groups based on 
security levels, which are employed to specify the accuracy of delivering 
location information to them [25]. Consequently, it’s required to encrypt the 
location information at different accuracy levels with different keys to reflect 
these security levels. In a typical secure inter-group communication scenario, 
only memb
s
from [25]. 
 
In terms of Pub/Sub infrastructures for ubiquitous environments, secure levels 
can be directly mapped to definitions of access control levels, which in turn can 
be defined in term of users’ privacy policy. As a result, it’ll not be enough 
a
must comply with the specified privacy rules fro access the subscribed event. 
 
For the design of our proposed key establishment scheme, we consider the 
privacy rules of event publishers or event owners. And of course, we have to 
consider the dynamic and large size subscribers group. This is the major 
contribution of this thesis. In addition, we cons
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analyze them from the perspective of our work. 
 
sues may include, the security goals of the 
cheme, the perspective of the users groups, the features of the application 
signing key management schemes for Pub/Sub infrastructures 
 ubiquitous environments. In addition, we specify which factors we consider 
, we discuss how we plan 
 for the subscribers groups, at a local broker in a 
ub/Sub network, was defined as a secure group communication problem [20]. 
Securit
goals were stated as follows:  
 
2) Forward Confidentiality: C e 
3) Backward Confidentia  added at time t should not have 
access to any key used to encrypt multicast 
the design of our proposal. In the next section, we review these factors and we
3.4 Key Management for Ubiquitous Publish/Subscribe: Design 
Guides 
When designing group key management schemes, several issues affect the 
design decisions. In general, these is
s
environment, the efficiency of the key management process, and how secure is 
the key management process itself.  
 
In this section, we review a number of influential factors which should be 
considered for de
in
and which we don’t. Also, for the considered factors
to address them. 
 
3.4.1 Security Goals for Group Key Management  
The key management problem
P
y goals have been defined for a solution to such problem [26]. These 
“1) Non-group Confidentiality: Clients that were never part of the group 
should not access any key that can decrypt 
any multicast data sent to the group; 
lients deleted from the group at some tim
t do not have access to any key used to 
encrypt multicast data after t, unless they 
are authorized to join again the group;  
lity: a user
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4) Collusion Freedom: n
ture group communication, even by 
ll of these requirements assume that legitimate users do not leak their 
at a subscription, from a 
lient to its local Pub/Sub broker, is encrypted by a shared secret key, i.e. 
may be employed using subgroups 
ierarchies of security agents at the local Pub/Sub brokers [24]. An example of 
privacy is considered as a 
ocial issue. Social aspects have been studied from the perspective of affecting 
data before t while the user was not part of 
the group. 
o subset of deleted clients should be able to 
decrypt fu
sharing the keys they had before their 
deletion; 
A
keys to unauthorized users on purpose.” [26]. 
 
For our work, we focus on the first three security goals. For the last goal we 
assume that a trusted Pub/Sub broker, which is local to its clients, is delegated 
the role of a key manager. This broker is assumed not to disclose enough 
information about the key establishment process to the subscribers, which limits 
the chances of collusions attacks. It is also assumed th
c
between the client and the local Pub/Sub broker [14].  
 
The above assumptions have the advantage of eliminating the dependency of 
subscriber nodes on each other to establish their own group key. However, if 
this is considered as bottle-neck solution, i.e. in terms of overloading the local 
Pub/Sub brokers, then hierarchical solutions 
h
this approach was reviewed in section 3.2.2. 
 
3.4.2 User-Centric Group Key Management 
In addition to viewing our key establishment problem as a secure group 
communication problem, we also consider user privacy as our main protected 
asset by our key establishment proposal. Also, user 
s
the design of group key management schemes [27].  
 
For the purpose of our work we consider a number of these issues [27]. The 
first important issue is the group size, which requires the key establishment 
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o core data structures for the key 
stablishment process, each one of them has its own computational complexity. 
ser. 
e utilize the inherited clustering of users at their local Pub/Sub brokers as a 
 broker to the clients is used as a key 
erver. In our future work, higher level key managers may be employed. More 
sue by employing 
gical key hierarchies, which have been reviewed in section 3.2.2, in our 
current proposal. More details can be found in section 4.7.5. 
 
scheme to be completed in the shortest possible time regardless to the group 
size. This is important because users can’t wait for long key establishment 
times. From the perspective of work, the required time for key establishment is 
mainly dependent on the key establishment process at Pub/Sub brokers which 
are local to clients. We consider tw
e
More details can be found in chapter 4. 
 
A second issue is robustness to errors, which is important for ubiquitous 
assumptions of little, or even non-existing, user awareness [27]. In turn, a key 
establishment mechanism should assume very limited dependency on users’ 
actions to successfully complete its task. From the perspective of work, the key 
establishment is done at the side of Pub/Sub brokers which are local to the u
W
basis for providing fault tolerance; this is discussed in details in section 3.5. 
 
Another important issue is the structure of the users group. This issue is mainly 
about selecting a leader node for the key establishment process [27]. In 
particular, such selection depends on which node the group has trusted as a 
leader. In our proposal, a local Pub/Sub
s
details can be found in chapter 4 and 5.  
 
A final important issue is the membership flexibility. From the perspective of 
our work, this is mainly about the frequent change in users’ interests, which 
results into the frequent join/leave rates. We address this is
lo
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3.4.3 Group Key Management and the Volatility Principle 
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, a main characteristic of the ubiquitous 
environments is defined by the volatility principle.  This feature should be 
considered as a main design principle for ubiquitous solutions. Similarly, 
volatility is a feature of mobile ad-hoc networks, MANETs. Volatility in 
MANETs has been considered from the perspective of key establishment 
schemes [28]. Considering the special requirements of MANETs - which 
include mobility, constrained resources, and the lack of trusted centralized 
infrastructure, we may learn from its key establishment solutions to influence 
our solution in the ubiquitous case.  
 
Several requirements for key establishment schemes in MANETs were defined 
[28]. Basically, a key establishment scheme is required to be lightweight with 
respect to consuming bandwidth, energy, storage, and computation costs. In 
addition, volatility requires that the key establishment times to be shorter and 
the key refreshment events to be more frequent. However, achieving such 
requirements is difficult in the case of MANETs because of the lack of trusted 
infrastructure [28], which requires every node in MANETs to be more aware 
about other nodes in the network for secure key establishment.  
 
For a ubiquitous environment, volatility exists mainly at the clients’ side. In 
contrast to the case in MANETs, a ubiquitous Pub/Sub infrastructure can be 
used to provide a basis of trust for a key establishment scheme. In addition, 
neighbour client nodes may not need to be aware of each other to obtain group 
keys. This is because they interact with the service through their local Pub/Sub 
brokers.  
 
Finally, for the requirement of short key establishment times, this is defined as 
a problem of frequent subscribe/unsubscribe of clients at their local Pub/Sub 
brokers. In other words, it’s a frequent join/leave problem in terms of secure 
group communication. We address this issue by employing logical key 
hierarchies, which have been reviewed in section 3.2.2, in our proposal. This is 
Chapter 3                                           Secure Group Communication in Pub/Sub  
  50
also dependent on the core data structure which is used by the local Pub/Sub 
broker for key establishment, more details can be found in chapter 4. 
 
3.4.4 Encryption for Secure Group Key Distribution 
In a ubiquitous environment, existing devices are usually mobile nodes and 
sensor nodes, which typically interact by means of wireless communication [1, 
29]. For the severely constrained resources of such nodes, the complexity of 
asymmetric encryption is usually considered as quite highly. Consequently, for 
any type of confidentiality support for such devices, symmetric keys are usually 
the preferred choice [26]. Such decision is supported by the results of 
comparing the computational costs of using symmetric and asymmetric 
encryptions [30]. 
 
For the secure group communication problem, it’s important to consider the 
secure distribution of the group keys to the concerned groups of subscribers. 
For this purpose, the confidentiality of group key update messages must be 
protected. In turn, we have to choose between symmetric encryption and 
asymmetric encryption for encrypting the group key updates. To make this 
decision for a security solution in a ubiquitous environment, we’ve to consider 
the resource constrained devices in this environment, viz. mobile and sensor 
devices.  
 
We may consider the worst case, i.e. sensor nodes. This is just for making very 
constrained decision; however sensor nodes will not be involved in the secure 
group communication problem at the Pub/Sub last mile, which is the main 
problem of this thesis. It has been shown that the performance of some 
asymmetric encryption algorithms, e.g. elliptic key cryptography, is very close 
to being a practical choice for these sensor nodes [29].  
 
The advantage of using asymmetric encryption over symmetric encryption, for 
the purpose of secure group key distribution, is that the private key of a client 
node can be pre-stored on this node. This is opposite to the case of pair-wise 
key establishment, e.g. by means of keys pre-distributions or variants of Deffi-
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Hellman key exchange [29]. This property enables asymmetric encryption to be 
widely used as a security bootstrap, which is the case in Internet. However, the 
complexity of asymmetric cryptography is still being considered as a big 
disadvantage with respect to applying it to resources constrained devices. 
Several efforts have been done and are being done for the purpose of reducing 
the complexity, and the computation costs, of the asymmetric encryption; but 
more efforts are required [29]. 
 
Compared to the case of sensor nodes, mobile nodes have more relaxed 
resource constrains. In this thesis mobile nodes represent the client nodes in the 
secure group communication problem of Pub/Sub events delivery. In turn, 
asymmetric encryption may be suitable for securing group key update messages 
to these nodes. But this can contradict with the frequent subscribe/unsubscribe 
events, i.e. frequent join/leave events, in ubiquitous environments.  
 
In particular, asymmetric encryption may be used for the purpose of 
authentication, which happens only to a newly subscribing node and not to 
other subscribers, which are current members of the subscribers group. 
Consequently, symmetric encryption can be used for frequent group key 
updates, which is a main choice for several group key distribution schemes as 
we mentioned in section 3.2.2. 
 
3.4.5 Security of Group Key Management 
The popular secure group communication mechanisms, e.g. key hierarchies 
[19], usually consider security issues like forward security and backward 
security. However, they have been proved to be vulnerable to an attack which 
targets a legitimate group member to obtain some previously used group keys in 
addition to the current group key [21, 31]. This contradicts with the belief that 
such attack can obtain only the currently group key. This attack can be very 
powerful in environments where it is possible to the attacker to capture 
legitimate group members, e.g. sensor nodes, ad-hoc nodes, and mobile nodes, 
which are all typical examples of nodes in a ubiquitous environment.  
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This attack depends on recording the encrypted traffic to that legitimate node, 
which includes re-keying events. Then, it makes use of a captured used group 
key/individual key, which is currently being used for the purpose of re-keying 
and which can be obtained from the captured node, to decrypt previous re-
keying event messages. This way it can disclose past group encryption keys. 
Immunity against this powerful attack can be achieved by modifying the used 
group communication key management scheme; however, extra computational 
costs are required. For the purpose of this thesis, we only consider the common 
security issues by group communication key management, e.g. forwards 
security and backward security. This kind of attack is totally out of the scope of 
our work. 
 
3.4.6 Privacy and Trust in Dynamic Large Scale Communication 
Infrastructures 
In dynamic large scale communication environments, enforcing user’s privacy 
is dependent on the user’s trust in the communication infrastructure. This issue 
is illustrated in very important example environment, which is the cellular 
access network. This communication environment shares many characteristics 
with ubiquitous environments, e.g. the large numbers of users and dynamism.  
 
In cellular networks, privacy-aware security underpinnings were investigated 
[32]. In particular, both the user authentication and the key establishment 
processes were enhanced to support users’ location and identity privacy at 
different levels of security contexts. Similarly to the performance issues in the 
ubiquitous environments, privacy-aware security in cellular networks considers 
performance issues like mobility management signalling, which can have the 
same position as the frequent join/leave subscribers in a ubiquitous Pub/Sub 
infrastructure. 
 
Considering the similarity between the ubiquitous environment and the cellular 
environment, we may learn from the privacy-aware security solution for the 
cellular environment to influence our security solution for the ubiquitous one. 
This solution defines a model of a cellular network in terms of three entities, 
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viz. User Entity, UE, which is typically a mobile node, Home Entity, HE, which 
manages the UE subscription, location and charging data, and a Serving Entity, 
SE, which is an access point with respect to the UE [32]. In particular, we may 
learn how the trust issue is handled to achieve privacy-aware security solution. 
 
From a security trust point of view, the proposal defines three security trust 
relationships, viz. a long term one between the UE and the HE, another long 
term trust relationship between the HE and the SE, and finally a transitive 
medium-term trust between the SE and the UE based on the former two long-
term rust relationships.  These security trust relationships are discriminated 
from the privacy trust relationships, where the UE considers both the HE and 
the SE as just semi-rusted entities [32].  
 
More specifically, privacy levels of the identity and the location of the UE are 
defined. Firstly, the HE   should not be allowed to know the exact location of 
the UE. Secondly, the SE should not be allowed to know the exact identity of 
the UE. Finally, an adversary node must not be allowed to any piece of 
information of the UE [32]. Then, the proposal goes into specific cellular 
network details to achieve privacy-aware authentication and key agreement 
protocol, which we are not concerned with them in this thesis. 
 
From the perspective of our work, i.e. Pub/Sub for ubiquitous environments, a 
UE can be mapped to a publisher/subscriber, and an SE can be mapped to a 
Pub/Sub broker which is currently local to that publisher/subscriber. In the case 
of the cellular network, a UE does not fully trust a SE to completely disclose its 
identity information, e.g. for authentication purposes. A similar case may exist 
in a Pub/Sub network; a subscriber may not fully trust its local broker from a 
privacy point of view. As a result, two categories of privacy-aware security 
solutions may be proposed, viz. one which assumes full trust in the brokers of 
the Pub/Sub network and another which assumes entrusted brokers.  
 
These trust assumptions affect authentication based access control, which 
requires user’s information to build trust relationships. In particular, for 
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ubiquitous applications, disclosing user’s information to entrusted service 
providers, i.e. a Pub/Sub broker, contradicts with the privacy of the user [39]. 
Also, these trust assumptions affects the delegation of group key management, 
for the purpose of secure event multicasting. For the purpose of our proposal, 
we consider the case of trusted Pub/Sub brokers; while in our future work we 
consider the case of entrusted Pub/Sub brokers, including terminal/local 
brokers. 
 
3.4.7 Secure Collection of Users’ Data 
In ubiquitous environments, a wide utilization of sensor networks is employed 
[1]. Their main function is to collect users’ data, get their context information, 
and/or fire events about them. Sensor nodes form the front end of ubiquitous 
environments. When firing events about collected users’ data, sensor nodes 
should encrypt the events information. A main encryption key establishment 
scheme in sensor networks is random key pre-distribution [11, 33]. Originally, 
this scheme is made to efficiently establish unique pair wise keys among sensor 
nodes in a sensor network.  
 
The key pre-distribution scheme has been improved for deployments in large 
scale networks with no constrains on the sensors deployment density or 
distribution [33], which makes it useful for the dynamic large scale ubiquitous 
environments.  Securing the collected users’ data by sensor nodes in a 
ubiquitous is out of the scope of this thesis. Also, we assume that the proposed 
privacy-aware encryption is done by authorized Pub/Sub brokers, which are 
local to event publishers, which can be sensor nodes. 
 
In this section, we discussed the considered factors in our design. In the next 
section we explain the main approach that our proposal follows, namely fault 
tolerant clustered key management.  
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3.5 Clustered Group Key Management: Our Main Approach 
As we mentioned in section 2.3.1, the ubiquitous environment is a volatile and 
fault prone application environment. Consequently, the main approach of our 
key establishment proposal must be based on a scheme which is compatible 
with these two features. In this section, we review a significant fault tolerant 
clustered group key management proposal [22]. Also, its features are discussed 
in terms of Pub/Sub interaction.  
 
In our proposal, clients, i.e. Pub/Sub subscribers, indirectly contribute to the 
key generation process in terms of their subscriptions. At the same time, we 
propose that the actual key generation process is done by a third trusted party. 
For the current status of our proposal, a local Pub/Sub broker functions as this 
trusted third party. For our future work, a special cluster head key manager does 
the same role. Both of these schemes agree with a recent proposal of clustered 
key establishment [22].  
 
In particular, even if we use distributed key management schemes, there is also 
a need for some sort of centralized authority, which at least can control the 
group membership by means of access control. Two main features arise from 
following this approach, namely, concurrent key management of client nodes 
clusters and fault tolerant key management. 
 
3.5.1 Concurrent Group Key Management 
To provide a scalable key management scheme, client nodes can be clustered 
for the purpose of managing the keys of each cluster concurrently while 
managing the keys of other clusters [22]. For our proposal, such concurrent key 
management is provided at the level of the whole Pub/Sub network. This is 
achieved by the distribution of the key management of spatially clustered client 
nodes among their local Pub/Sub brokers, assuming that these brokers are 
trusted. This is a directly inherited feature from the distributed structure of the 
Pub/Sub brokers’ network. In our future work, concurrent key management is 
achieved by higher level cluster heads of brokers’ clusters.  
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3.5.2 Fault Tolerant Group Key Management 
In addition to scalability, clustering of client nodes is used to achieve fault 
tolerance [22]. This is done by isolating a cluster of client nodes when a fault, 
e.g. a communication error, happens inside this cluster. Then fault handling by 
means of rejoining the cluster members again to the group communication. 
Such considerations are required for pure key agreement protocols, when there 
is a big dependency among group members.  
 
In Pub/Sub interaction, client nodes contribute to the key establishment process 
only by means of their subscriptions. In addition, a natural clustering of the 
client nodes exists at the local Pub/Sub brokers. As a result, we mainly consider 
the case of link failure between a client node and its local Pub/Sub broker. The 
mechanism of detecting such link failure is out of the scope of our proposal; 
however, we define its handling mechanism as handler of a group leave event 
with respect to our key management scheme. 
 
3.6 Summary: Requirements and Primary Solutions 
In this chapter, we defined the problem of secure event multicasting at the 
Pub/Sub last mile as a secure group key establishment problem, in sections 3.1 
and 3.2. The efficient distribution of group keys is a main requirement for our 
proposal. In section, 3.2.2, we mentioned that we use key hierarchies for 
efficient key distribution.  
 
In section 3.3, we concluded requirement of encrypting the same event using 
different keys to reflect different privacy levels. In our proposal, we start our 
key establishment scheme by viewing privacy dimensions as attributes in 
Pub/Sub data structures, which can express coverage relations among the values 
of these dimensions.  In section 3.4.1, we concluded the requirements of 
forward and backward security of the established keys by our proposal. We 
address these two requirements by considering the dynamics of subscribers 
groups. In section, 3.4.2, we concluded that users mainly prefer less effort from 
their side to establish group keys. We address this requirement by depending on 
their local Pub/Sub brokers of key establishment.  
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Also, users are concerned with fault tolerant and rapid key establishment 
process. We address fault tolerance by utilising the already existing clustering 
of users around their local brokers, as we discussed in section 3.5. For the rapid 
key establishment, which is also a requirement of the volatile ubiquitous 
environment as we reviewed in section 3.4.3, we consider the computational 
costs when we choose the core data structure which we start our key 
establishment from. More details can be found in chapter 4. Also, a useful 
extension to our proposal may require assuming entrusted local Pub/Sub 
brokers. In section 3.4.6, we reviewed how such assumption can be made in a 
privacy aware manner. Our future work makes a similar assumption and makes 
use of this reviewed scheme. More details can be found in chapter 5.  
 
In section 3.4.4 we emphasise the suitability of symmetric encryption for secure 
distribution of encryption keys. However, establishing the key distribution keys 
is out of the scope of this thesis. Also, the security of the group key 
management itself and the secure collection of users’ data are out of the scope 
of this thesis, this is discussed in sections 3.4.5 and 3.4.7.  
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Privacy-Aware Key Establishment 
for Ubiquitous Publish/Subscribe 
Infrastructures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4                                                         Privacy-Aware Key Establishment 
  59
In this chapter, we introduce our key establishment proposal. We design our 
scheme to be suitable for encrypting events with attributes of privacy 
dimensions. The assumed usage of this proposal is to secure events distribution 
at the Pub/Sub last mile, i.e., to subscribers groups. In ubiquitous environments, 
the subscribers groups are large and dynamic, which imposes more 
considerations on our proposed key establishment scheme. 
 
In section 2.5, the considerations and assumptions by our proposed scheme 
were specified. In section 3.6, main requirements were extracted from the 
reviewed issues in chapter 3. These requirements are addressed in an 
incremental way through our design attempts in this chapter. Also, in section 
3.6, primary solutions were discussed. We use them as starting points in 
different parts of our proposal. Next, we use the reviewed approaches of 
defining privacy rules in section 2.4.1 as our first starting point. 
 
4.1 Categorization of Privacy Rules 
In section 2.4.1, we mentioned that most common user privacy dimensions in a 
ubiquitous environment form the following set: 
 
{Identity, Location, Time, Activity, Nearby people} [12] 
 
Also we mentioned that a user can control his information privacy in terms of 
disclose/not disclose rules or in terms of information resolution. We define 
these two approaches of privacy policy specifications as two design concepts, 
which we consider in both our work and its possible future extension.  
 
4.1.1 Binary Privacy Rules 
Firstly, a user may define that his information to be disclosed or undisclosed 
when these information has specific values. For example, he may specify that 
his location information is not disclosed to another user at specific values of the 
location dimension. He may also specify this based on other dimensions, e.g. at 
specific hours of the day if we consider the time dimension or when he is on a 
meeting with customers with respect to the dimension of nearby people. In this 
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text, we assume that all the privacy rules are defined in term of “Allowed-to” 
rules [13], i.e., white lists. 
 
4.1.2 Resolution-Based Privacy Rules 
Secondly, a user may define that his information to be disclosed only at specific 
resolution levels of the privacy dimensions. For example, he may specify that 
his location information is disclosed at the level of the building numbers and 
not the exact room he is in. The user may also involve other dimensions, e.g. 
the user may specify different resolution levels of disclosing his location 
information at different hours of the day, if we consider the time dimension. In 
this thesis, we do not assume any resolution based privacy rules; however we 
consider this in our future work. More details can be found in chapter 5. 
 
To realize both categories of privacy rules, we assume that an access control 
entity has a database of dimensions schema. In this data base, dimension 
models define the structure of the considered dimensions. In particular, it 
defines how different values of the privacy dimensions, at different aggregation 
levels, are related to each other. An example of such dimensions modelling was 
defined for location based service [34]. In particular, we assume that an access 
control entity uses the dimension scheme as reference for interpreting the 
privacy rules specified by the user. In figure.8, we illustrate an example 
dimension scheme for the location dimension while in figure.9 we illustrate an 
example dimension scheme for the time dimension. 
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Fig.8. Location scheme [34]     Fig.9. Time scheme [34] 
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4.2 First Data Structure Assumption: Hierarchies of Privacy 
Rules 
We assume in section 4.1 that an access control entity uses dimensions schema 
as reference for interpreting the privacy rules specified by the user. 
Furthermore, we assume that when we query the access control entity to get a 
representation of the privacy rules, which were specified by a user in terms of a 
particular privacy dimension, then a simple hierarchy of this dimension will be 
returned. If the hierarchy does not have a root, e.g., for “allowed to any value” 
rule, then we assume an imaginary root. 
 
This hierarchy is assumed to include nodes which represent specific values or 
ranges of the privacy dimension. At each node, there is a set of authorized users 
who are allowed to access the user’s data of this associated value or range. 
Dimensions hierarchies based on dimensions schema have been defined for 
location based services [34]. In figure.10, we illustrate an example dimension 
hierarchy for the location dimension while in figure.11 we illustrate an example 
dimension hierarchy for the time dimension. 
 
Fig.10. a location dimension hierarchy [34] 
 
  62
Chapter 4                                                         Privacy-Aware Key Establishment 
 
 
 
  63
Fig.11. a time dimension hierarchy 
4.3 First Design Attempt: Mapping Dimension Hierarchies to Key 
Hierarchies 
ay 
f building an attribute hierarchy is dependent on the attribute’s data types.  
 
In this design attempt, we start our design attempt from a recent and significant 
proposal of attribute-based key establishment [4]. It is proposed for encrypting 
attributes in Publish/Subscribe events. In that proposal, the relations among the 
ranges of the values of a given attribute are described as a hierarchy. The w
o
 
For example, for an integer attribute, the root of the hierarchy spans its valid 
full range, while the next level is formed by two nodes which each of them 
spans half that range. In other words, it is a binary tree representation of the 
ranges of the attribute [4]. Based on this attribute ranges hierarchy, a key 
hierarchy is established. In particular, a key is established for each node in the 
attribute ranges hierarchy. In the next section we explain more about extract 
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o important design principles from this proposal. In addition, we explain 
rom the above mentioned attribute based key establishment proposal, we can 
es: 
ps, then we can have a volatility-compatible key 
stablishment scheme which is suitable to the dynamics of subscribers groups 
a
atenating ‘0’ to K  to 
compute K pute K  to go further into the key hierarchy. 
ple 
rivacy dimensions hierarchies, where one-to-many parent-child relationships 
are guaranteed [36]. And this is the basis of our proposal in the next section. 
tw
more about building the attribute key hierarchy. 
 
4.3.1 Design Principles 
F
learn the following design principl
 
Data-Centric Key Establishment 
Key hierarchies can be established in a totally dependent way on the being 
encrypted data attributes in Publish/ Subscribe events. Viewing the established 
keys as group keys for subscribers groups to these events, this key 
establishment approach is totally opposite to the common group-dependent key 
establishment. If we can totally isolate the key establishment process from the 
dynamics of subscribers grou
e
in ubiquitous environments. 
 
Derivation of Blinded Keys from a Single Parent Key 
As illustrated in figure.12, the hierarchy of ranges of a given attribute is 
represented as a binary tree [4]. For encrypting attribute value for subscribers to 
the root of the tree, i.e. those who are llowed to read any value of the attribute, 
it’s theoretically possible to use the root key, which does not happen in practice 
[4]. This root key is referred to as K φ . Then, to derive a key to represent the 
left child of the root node, ‘0’ is concatenated to K φ , and a one way function is 
applied to compute K 0 . This process repeats by conc 0
and ‘1’ to com 0100
Similarly, K 1  and its ancestor keys can be computed.   
 
Because a one way function is used to derive child keys, these keys can be 
referred to as blinded keys [35], because higher child keys can’t be used to 
compute parent keys. This kind of blinded key derivation is suitable for sim
p
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Fig.12. a binary key hierarchy [4] 
ur first design attempt. We start by 
efining our first proposed design concept. 
case of binary 
trees. Consequently, we propose the concept of dotted key index. 
 key 
index of the encryption key at node n in this tree can be defined as:  
 
4.3.2 Privacy-Aware Simple Key Hierarchy  
At this point, we can start the proposal of o
d
 
Dotted Key Index 
At this point, we assume using a simple privacy dimension hierarchy. A node in 
this hierarchy can have only one parent. However, the hierarchy can be 
represented by a tree of any order n, and not just a binary tree. In turn, we have 
to review the way we label the key, since concatenating ‘0’/‘1‘ to the parent key 
to produce an input to the one way function is only suitable in the 
 
Design Concept.1 
A Dotted key index is a string which represents the position of a key in 
an n-order tree representation of a given simple key hierarchy. The
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| ‘.’ | i  | ‘.’ | i  ………….| ‘.’ | i
………………| ‘.’ | i
ode, and the 
operato
 using a single binary figure/digit 
 add a new child in the case of binary tree.  
has the key index 4, which in turn has the most right child with key index 
 
Fig.13. a key hierarchy with dotted key indices 
to any other node in a given dimension hierarchy, the key index of this new 
keyIndex(n) = i 0  1 2 r   
n  
 
, where i x is the string representation of an integer which represents the 
position of parent node x among the set of the children nodes of parent 
node x-1, the node with key index 0 is always the root n
r ‘|’ defines the operation of string concatenation.  
  
The advantage of defining the dotted key index concept is providing a key 
labelling scheme which is totally independent from the order of the tree which 
represents the key hierarchy. I.e., i x can be represented using any number of 
figures/digits, as opposite to the constraint of
to
 
An example of a key hierarchy with key indices labels is illustrated in figure.13. 
From this figure we can see the root node with key index 0 and its most right 
child 
4.3.  
 
Elementary Operations 
According to the above definition, when a node is newly inserted as child node 
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child node can be derived from the key index of its parent node using the 
following procedure:  
 
Procedure.1 
Let c be a newly added child node to node p in a simple hierarchy H, 
which represents the specified privacy rules by user U on the privacy 
dimension M. Then keyIndex(c) can be computed from keyIndex(p) as 
follows 
 
1. Increment the numberOfChildren(p) by 1  
2. Define keyIndex(c) = keyIndex(p) | ‘.’ | numberOfChildren (p)  
 
, where numberOfChildren(x) represents the number of nodes which 
have been added to node x as children since the addition of x to the H, 
and the operator ‘|’ defines the string concatenation operation.  
 
The key index at node n is used to compute the encryption key k  at the same 
node as follows: 
n
 
Procedure.2 
Let keyIndex(n) be the key index at node n in a simple hierarchy H, 
which represents the specified privacy rules by user U on the privacy 
dimension M. Then keyIndex(n) can be used to generate the encryption 
key at node n, encryptionKey (n) ,as follows: 
 
1. Define keyIndexElements = removeCharacter(keyIndex(n), 
‘.’) 
2. Define owfInput = encryptionKey(p) | keyIndexElements 
3. Compute encryptionKey (n) = OWF(owfInput) 
 
, where removeCharacter(s, c) returns string s without c characters, 
encryptionKey(p) in the encryption key of node p, the parent node of n, 
the key of the root node of H is the current priate key of the access 
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control entity,  OWF is a one way function, and the operator ‘|’ defines 
the string concatenation operation.  
 
Handling Addition of Nodes to Dimension Hierarchy 
In terms of the above defined elementary operations, namely Procedure.1 and 
Procedure.2. We define a procedure to generate key hierarchy from a privacy 
dimension hierarchy. We assume that it is possible to query an access control 
entity to return the policy rules of a user from the perspective of a specific 
privacy dimension M. Also, we assume that the query result is represented as a 
simple hierarchy H. We define the procedure of generating a simple key 
hierarchy, K from H as follows: 
 
Procedure.3 
Let H be a simple hierarchy, which represents the specified privacy 
rules by user U on the privacy dimension M. When U specifies a new 
privacy rule which results into inserting a new node c into H, then the 
privacy-aware simple key hierarchy, K, is modified as follows: 
 
1. If node c is inserted as a child to node p so that c is a leaf 
node then, 
a. Compute keyIndex(c) = Procedure.1(keyIndex(p)) 
b. Compute encryptionKey(c) = Procedure.2(keyIndex(c)) 
c. Set the numberOfChildren(c) to integer value 0 
2. If node c is inserted as a child to node p so that c is an 
intermediate node then, 
a. Do the same as stated in case 1 of this procedure 
b. Compute children(c) as the set which contains every 
previous child node to p which is now a child node to c 
c. For every e ∈children(c), call Procedure.4(e) 
3. If c is inserted as the root of H then, 
a. If there is an assumed imaginary root node, replace it 
with c.  
b. Obtain a new root encryption key 
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c. Compute children(c) as every node which was at the 
highest level of H before adding c  
c. For every e ∈children(c), call Procedure.4(e) 
 
, where numberOfChildren(x) represents the number of nodes which 
have been added to node x as children since the addition of x to the H, 
and children(x) is the set of children nodes to node x.  
 
In Procedure.3, the creation of a key index for a newly added node to the 
dimension hierarchy may require to update the keys of the whole key hierarchy, 
i.e., in case of inserting the new node as a root node. Also, it may require to 
update a subset of the key hierarchy, i.e., in case of inserting the new node as an 
intermediate node. We define this updating process as follows: 
 
Procedure.4 
Let n be a node in a simple hierarchy H, which represents the specified 
privacy rules by user U on the privacy dimension M. When the privacy-
aware simple key hierarchy K is required to be updated starting from 
the key index keyIndex(n) then, 
 
1. Set the numberOfChildren attribute of n to integer value 0 
2. Compute keyIndex(n) = Procedure.1(keyIndex(n)) 
3. Compute encryptionKey(n) = Procedure.2(keyIndex(n)) 
4. Compute children(n) as the set of current linked children 
nodes to n 
5. If children(n) ≠ φ , then for every e ∈ children(c), call 
Procedure.4(e) 
  
, where numberOfChildren(x) represents the number of nodes which 
have been added to node x as children since the addition of x to the H, 
and children(x) is the set of children nodes to node x.  
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After handling the addition of new nodes to the dimension hierarchy we now 
move to handling the removal of such nodes from the dimension hierarchy. 
 
Handling Removal of Nodes from Dimension Hierarchy 
We defined the following procedure to handle the removal of a node from the 
dimension hierarchy: 
 
Procedure.5 
Let H be a simple hierarchy, which represents the specified privacy 
rules by user U on the privacy dimension M, When U specifies a new 
privacy rule which results into deleting a node n from H, then the 
privacy-aware simple key hierarchy, K, is modified as follows: 
 
1. If node n was a leaf node then, do no thing. 
2. If node n was an intermediate node then, 
a. Compute children(n) as the set of previous children 
nodes to n 
c. For every e ∈children(c), call Procedure.4(e) 
3. If node n is the root of H then, 
a. If there is no node in H which can be used as a root, 
then create and imaginary root node which represents 
the “Allowed to any value” rule 
b. Obtain a new root encryption key 
c. Compute children(n) as every node which is now at the 
highest level of H after removing n  
c. For every e ∈children(n), call Procedure.4(e) 
 
, where children(x) is the set of children nodes to node x.  
 
The set of above defined procedures are used to build a simple key hierarchy. 
The procedures utilize a dimension hierarchy which represents the privacy rules 
specified by a user from the perspective of a particular privacy dimension. In 
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the next, we explain how the established simple hierarchy can be used in a 
Publish/Subscribe based privacy-aware application.  
 
4.3.3 Usage 
In this section, we explain how the simple key hierarchy mechanism can be 
used in the context of a privacy-aware Pub/Sub infrastructure. First, we define 
the interacting entities as follows: 
 
Definition Listing.1 
User Entity, UE: a user who specifies his own privacy rules 
Access Control Entity, ACE: an entity which maintains the privacy 
rules of UE and builds simple key hierarchies. 
An ACE may be implemented in a central or a 
distributed fashion. 
Dimension Schema Respiratory, DSR: a database of dimension 
schema. A dimension scheme represents the 
coverage relations of the values of a given 
privacy dimension. A DSR may be implemented 
in a central or a distributed fashion. 
Publish Subscribe Service, Pub/Sub: a network of Pub/Sub brokers. 
Local Pub/Sub Brokers, LB: event routers which are located at the 
border of the Pub/Sub brokers cloud and which 
function as access points for the publishers and 
subscribers to access the Pub/Sub service. 
Intermediates Pub/Sub Brokers, IB: event routers which are not 
directly accessible by Publishers or 
subscribers. 
Publisher Entity, PE: an authorized Pub/Sub publisher entity that may 
publish events about UE  
Subscriber Entity, SE: an authorized Pubs/Sub subscriber entity that 
may subscribe to receive events about UE. 
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Key Hierarchy Maintenance at ACE 
In fig.14, we explain the sequence of handling of a UE request to add/remove a 
node to/from the simple hierarchy of a given privacy dimensions. First the UE 
submits the request to the ACE. In turn, the ACE refers to the DSR to get the 
position of the given privacy dimension values with respect to the dimension 
hierarchy it already has. Then, based on the response from the DSR, the ACE 
maintains the dimension and the key hierarchy. Finally, the ACE may or may 
not acknowledge the UE about the accomplishment of the handling process, 
which is an open issue. 
Fig.14. Sequence of handling submitted user privacy rules 
 
Handling Event Subscriptions at Local Brokers 
After explaining the process of maintaining the key hierarchy by the ACE, we 
explain the handling of a subscription from SE to an event which contains a 
privacy variable of UE. In figure.15, an SE sends a message which contains its 
own access credentials and a subscription request to an event of UE to the 
nearest LB. This message is encrypted using a shared secret only between SE 
and LB. In turn, LB sends an access-request message to ACE on behalf of the 
SE. This message includes the predicate of the privacy variable of UE which SE 
wants to subscribe.  
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Fig.15. Sequence of handling user’s subscription 
 
Assuming that SE is authorized to the requested subscription, ACE replies to LB 
with access-granted message. This message contains the associated encryption 
key with the lowest level node in the hierarchy of the privacy dimension which 
covers the predicate in the access-request message. It also contains the key 
index of the included encryption key. Public key cryptography can be used o 
secure the communication between ACE and LB.  
 
Finally, the LB sends a message which contains the received encryption key and 
key index to SE. This message is encrypted with a shared secret only between 
SE and LB. In addition, LB stores the received encryption key and key index as 
associated security data with the node in its poset/forest data structure which 
contains the subscribed predicate as one of its filters. This is important for the 
process of privacy-aware secure event multicasting to the set of interested LB 
nodes. We explain this process later in this section. 
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Group Key Cashing at Local Brokers 
From another point of view, the storage of encryption keys and key indices at 
LB nodes can be used as a caching mechanism for the group key. This can be 
useful in case an SE subscribes to an already existing subscription through LB. 
In particular, it enables LB to reply to that SE with the encryption key and key 
index associated with this subscription without contacting the ACE. However 
the security of this mechanism is analyzed in section 4.3.4. 
 
Handling Event Subscriptions at Intermediate Brokers 
Above, we explained how a subscription request is handled by an LB. We have 
also to consider how IB nodes, in the Pub/Sub network, should handle 
forwarded subscriptions from LB nodes, with respect to interacting with key 
hierarchies at the ACE. In figure.16, we suggest a possible scenario of this 
process. For generality, we assume that an LB is also a special case of IB. 
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Fig.16. Broker to broker subscription handling and event encryption 
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 figure.16, an intermediate broker IB1 forwards a subscription to IB2. The 
his may be utilized for privacy-aware encryption inside the broker network. 
rivacy-Aware Secure Event Multicasting 
are encryption at the Pub/Sub last 
 turn, LB sends the encrypted message along with the key index to all 
encryption process.  
In
forwarding process is assumed to follow the rules of SIENA poset [8, 7]. IB2 
handles the received subscription from IB1 in the same way as an LB handles a 
received subscription from an SE. The only different is that IB1 does not 
provide any access credentials to IB2 to get an access-granted response from 
ACE. It is enough that IB2 gets the proper encryption key and key index from 
ACE. As a rule, IB2 uses the retrieved key to encrypt any events which match 
the previously received subscription from, and then it forwards the encrypted 
event to IB1. 
 
T
Basically, this feature can be useful in case of no symmetric encryption 
underpinning to secure event dissemination among the Pub/Sub brokers. 
Further investigation of this scenario is not in the scope of this text, however, 
this is scenario is an inspiration for our future work. Alternatively, we assume 
the existence of a symmetric encryption underpinning which is used to secure 
the event dissemination starting from any LB which functions as an access point 
to any PE. Consequently, we assume that IB nodes follow the rules of SIENA 
poset [8] for handling received subscription from other brokers. 
 
P
At this point, we can explain the privacy-aw
mile. In figure.17, when an LB receives an event with a value of the privacy 
dimension, it matches it against the poset nodes. Then the LB uses the 
associated key index to a matched poset/forest node, to retrieve the associated 
encryption key. Then, LB uses the key to encrypt the privacy dimension 
attribute in the event.  
 
In
interested SE nodes using multicasting. Upon receiving an encrypted event, an 
SE uses the associated key index to retrieve the used encryption key. Finally SE 
uses the retrieved key to decrypt the received event by applying a symmetric 
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Fig.17. Privacy-Aware Secure Event Multicasting 
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It’s very imp ngle event is 
ncrypted as many times as the number of the matching nodes in the 
Finally, we explain the handling of publishing events of UE by a PE. In 
e which contains its own access credentials and 
an event of UE to the nearest LB. In turn, the LB sends an access-request 
ortant to emphasize that a single attribute value in a si
e
poset/forest at the distributing LB. At each encryption time, a different 
encryption key may be used. This means that, a redundancy in associated 
encryption keys with poset/forest nodes may exist. This is dependent on the 
consistency between the coverage relations of poset/forest in the LB at one side 
and the coverage relations of the key hierarchy at the other side, with respect to 
the privacy dimension of course. We discuss this issue in section 4.3.4; 
however, we do not investigate it more for this design attempt. 
 
Handling Event Publications 
figure.18, a PE sends a messag
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message to ACE on behalf of the PE. This message includes the value of the 
privacy variable of UE which PE wants to publish. Assuming that PE is 
authorized to publish events about UE, ACE replies to LB with access-granted 
message.  
 
  77
 
proposed priva n LB uses the 
ssociated key index to the poset/forest node, which contains the matched 
e the event 
issemination starting from any LB which functions as an access to any PE. 
 
Fig.18. Sequence of handling event publication 
 
At this point there are two possibilities; first if we apply the previously
cy-aware encryption inside the broker network, the
a
predicate, with the being published event, to retrieve the encryption key. In 
addition, it is assumed that the neighbour IB to this LB knows the key index as 
well as the encryption which the LB will use to encrypt the event.  
 
The second possibility is the alternative assumption of the existence of a 
symmetric encryption underpinning which is used to secur
d
Finally, the LB encrypts the privacy variable attribute in the event using the 
proper encryption key, regardless of the used symmetric encryption 
underpinning. It’s an open issue whether the LB should acknowledge the PE 
about the accomplished operation or not.  
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 attempt. This analysis will move us 
 conclusions which results into proposing the second design attempt. Mainly 
e specify our analysis in the following points: 
cause the key hierarchy is built 
sed on the dimension hierarchy, the key hierarchy is also a simple hierarchy. 
 that privacy rules are described in term 
possible according to the 
ategorization of the dimension hierarchies [36]. However, other issues which 
set is a 
ery significant candidate data structure. In particular, we can view a given 
no 
ubscription will be added to the subscription lattice, i.e., poset/forest, at an LB 
ch represent the 
privacy rules at the ACE. As a result, it’s possible that two nodes in a 
4.3.4 Analysis 
In this section, we analyse our first design
to
w
  
Limitation of Simple Key Hierarchies 
In this design attempt, we assumed one parent at maximum for each node in a 
simple privacy dimension hierarchy. In turn, be
ba
However, it can not be always the case
of simple hierarchies. Instead, the key establishment process should start from a 
data structure which represents the coverage relations among the different 
values of a privacy dimension in a generalized form.  
 
Of course, one alternative is assuming that an ACE is able to represent a given 
set of privacy rules of a given UE as a non-simple dimension hierarchy instead 
of a simple hierarchy. Such assumption is of course 
c
we describe next in this section suggest the exclusion of this alternative. 
 
The other alternative is to move the key maintenance process to a totally 
different data structure which represents the coverage relations among the 
different values of a privacy dimension in a generalized form. SIENA po
v
privacy variable as an attribute in the filter nodes of poset, which is the starting 
point of our second design attempt. More details can be found in section 4.6. 
 
Inconsistent Dimension Hierarchy with Subscription Lattice  
In section 4.1, we assume that all the privacy rules we consider are defined in 
terms of “Allowed-to” rules [13], i.e., white lists. This means that at least 
s
unless it’s covered by a node in the dimension hierarchy, whi
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ncy, in the 
ncryption process, results from the inconsistency between the dimension 
ve the key establishment process to the 
ide of subscription lattice, so that the key hierarchy will be a reflection of it. 
Furthermore, we suggest that the LB may even cache 
ey indices and encryption keys for later fast responses to SE nodes.  
ntages are 
ltimate targets to any design which considers the volatility principle we 
subscription lattice, e.g. a parent node and its immediate childe, are both 
covered by the same lowest level node in the dimension hierarchy.  
 
In turn, both of these nodes will receive the same key index from the key 
hierarchy. Consequently, encrypting the target attribute in an event which 
matches with both the subscription lattice nodes is done twice, i.e., once for 
each match result, using the same encryption key. This redunda
e
hierarchy and the subscription lattice.  
 
One solution is to synchronize the content of these two sides. This is not 
reasonable because each of them is maintained for a completely different 
purpose. In particular, this solution requires modifications at the both the ACE 
and the LB. Another alterative is to mo
s
Again, this is the starting point of our second design attempt. More details can 
be found in section 4.6. 
 
Volatility Compatibility vs. Forward and Backward Security  
In section 4.3.3, we assume that the ACE maintains the key hierarchy and the 
LB retrieves the proper key indices and encryption keys from the ACE to 
distribute to SE nodes. 
k
 
These assumptions have two advantages. Firstly, the key hierarchy maintenance 
is done at the ACE without being aware to any of the subscribe/unsubscribe 
dynamics at the side of the LB nodes. Secondly, the LB is able to adapt with 
frequent changes in the subscribers membership. Both of these adva
u
reviewed in section 2.3.1. 
 
On the other hand, there is a main disadvantage of these assumptions, namely, 
no support of either forward or backward security, which we define in section 
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 nodes. A first possible approach to handle this 
roblem is to refresh the keys in the proper in response to the subscribers’ 
process to the LB nodes, 
hich this is a starting point of our second design attempt. More details can be 
ng to their coverage 
 filters which are not covered by any 
 is the root set of filters. An FP can be 
as filter attributes, regardless of how complex 
sers may specify their privacy policies. However, it’s important to note that 
3.4.1. Mainly, this is because the ACE is not aware of the group membership 
dynamics at the side of LB
p
group membership dynamics at the side of LB nodes.  
 
But such solution adds more overload to the ACE. Particularly, in addition to its 
main task of enforcing access control, the ACE will be aware of the 
subscribe/unsubscribe dynamics at the side of the LB nodes. In turn, a naturally 
evolving alternative is to move the key establishment 
w
found in the next sections 4.5 and 4.6. In the next section we review poset, the 
core data structure which we base our second attempt on. 
 
4.4 Partially Ordered Set: Poset 
To be able to forward events based on subscriptions, SIENA defines the filters 
poset (FP) data structure, which can be thought as the routing table for an event 
router [8, 7, 37, 38]. An FP stores filters by accordi
relations.  Most general filters are those
other filters in the poset. These filter form
used for matching notifications against filters by traversing it for only matching 
filters starting from the root set. 
 
From the perspective of our work, FP has a very important feature, namely, 
generality. This makes poset flexible for various filter semantics [38]. In 
particular, we use this generality combined with the coverage relations among 
filters to view privacy attributes 
u
this generality has been considered as a performance drawback from the 
perspective of the efficient event routing [38]. This is the reason behind 
extending our work to consider another more efficient variant of poset, namely, 
forest [38]. 
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4.4.1 Filter Coverage in Poset 
The coverage relation among filters is stated as follows: 
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Definiton.1 
“A filter F1 is said to cover the filter F2, denoted by F1 F2, if and 
ns that are matched by F2 are also matched by 
⊇  
only if all the notificatio
F1. The ⊇  relation is reflexive and transitive — and defines a partial 
order” [37, 8]. 
 
An eve
it receiv
routing t i
 
.4.2 Subscription Handling in Poset 
Procedure.6 
subscribers for the given subscription s, 
 subscription subscribe(X, f) where X is the subscriber and 
is the filter representing the subscription proceeds as follows: 
nt router builds its own FP data structure in response to the subscriptions 
es [37, 8]. For an event router, this FP building process is like the IP 
able build ng process for an IP router.  
4
The procedure that an event router follows upon receiving a subscription is 
defined as follows: 
 
“Subscribers(s) gives the set of 
and similarly, forwards(s) contains the subset of peers to which s has 
been sent. A
f 
 
1 - A filter f0 is found and f0 ⊇  f ∧  X ∈  subscribers(f0). Since f 
for X has already been subscribed by a covering filter the 
procedure terminates. 
2 - An equal filter f0 is found and f0 ⊇  f ∧  f ⊇  f0 ∧  X 
subscribers(f0). In this case, X is added to subscribers(f0). The 
s t
3 - n the poset between two possibly empty 
∈ 
server removes X from all sub crip ions covered by f and 
subscriptions with no subscribers. 
 The filter f is placed i
sets: immediate predecessors and immediate successors of f. 
The filter f is inserted and X is added to subscribers(f). The 
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re also removed.” [37]. 
Finally, the sub
newly inserted 
will forward the
subscription pr ons. 
However, from the perspective of our work, we only focus on the above listed 
er f. Between 
ese two sets, a new subscription is inserted. On the other hand, removing a 
m 
 a totally different data structure which represents the coverage relations 
lso, 
we proposed using SIENA poset to be used because of its generality in 
representing the coverage relations. Moreover, other points in section 4.3.4 
server removes X from all subscriptions covered by f and 
subscriptions with no subscribers a
 
scription handling procedure computes the forwards set for the 
subscription. This is the set of event routers to which the router 
 subscription further into the events routers’ network [37]. The 
ocess procedure has other considerations and optimizati
definition, which we will translate later in terms of dynamics of subscribers’ 
groups’, which of course affects our key establishment proposal.  
 
In poset, adding a new subscription is considered as a computationally heavy 
operation [37], because two lookup structures are computed, viz. 
predecessors(f), which represents the immediate predecessors of filter f, and 
successors(f), which represents the immediate successors of filt
th
subscription can be a low computational operation by utilising the already 
computed predecessors(f) and the successors(f) data structures [37]. More 
specifically, the being removed filter is disconnected from its predecessors and 
successors, then the predecessors and the successors are connecting according 
to their coverage relations. From the perspective of our work, the process of 
connecting/disconnecting a subscription filter to/from its predecessors and 
successor is the most elementary operation that we build our key establishment 
around it. This is for the purpose of not altering the original poset operations. 
 
4.5 Second Data Structure Assumption: Reflection of Privacy 
Rules 
In section 4.3.4, we conclude that we have to start the key establishment fro
to
among the different values of a privacy dimension in a generalized form. A
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ssumption of a simple hierarchy, 
hich represents the privacy rules from the perspective of a given privacy 
ce. For 
is purpose we define the following design concept: 
er Entity nodes, Sub-UE, 
hich is defined as follows: 
suggest moving the key establishment process to the LB nodes, where poset or 
its variant forest is maintained. This suggestion supports using poset a start for 
the proposed key establishment mechanism.  
 
In section 4.4.1, we define the coverage relation among filters in poset. 
Consequently, if we want to use poset as a starting point for key establishment, 
then we have to map privacy rules to poset. Simply we extend the assumption 
in section 4.2. In particular, we extend the a
w
dimension. We assume that a node in the extend data structure can have more 
than one parent. This data structure can be referred to as dimension multi-
hierarchy [36] or dimension lattice, which directly complies with poset. 
 
From another perspective, we assume that the maintenance and the 
representation of the privacy rules at the ACE side are black-box operations to 
the LB side. In turn we have to define how an LB will be aware of the privacy 
rules at the ACE side so that it can represent them in its own poset instan
th
 
Design Concept.2 
Reflected Rules Lattice is a sub-lattice of the poset lattice at a given 
Local Broker, LB. This sub-lattice consists of subscription nodes which 
were received by the LB from a subset of Us
w
 
Sub-UE = {ue : ue ∈  authorizedUsers(h), s ⊇  h,  h ∈  H, s ∈  S}  
 
, where H is a simple hierarchy which represents the specified privacy 
rules by user U on the pri
   
vacy dimension M, S is the subscription 
lattice, i.e. the poset instance at LB, and ⊇  defines the poset coverage 
relation
  
. 
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In the a
data str
at the L
this design concept, more details can be found in section 4.5, and 4.6.    
 
simple 
imension hierarchy to dimension lattice be defining the reflective rules lattice. 
 
stated in section 4.3.4, we start the key establishment from poset. Consequently, 
the resulting key data structure can be viewed as a key lattice. The main feature 
pt, we also 
onsider these two design principles. In addition, we define a third design 
to address the assumption of the existence of one or 
Design Concept.3 
ding to Design Concept.2, 
n that of the set of 
bove definition, we mapped the privacy rules which are represented by 
ucture H at the ACE side to nodes in the subscription lattice S, i.e., poset, 
B nodes’ side. In the second and the third design attempts, we start from 
4.6 Second Design Attempt: Mapping Dimension Lattices to Key 
Lattices 
In section 4.5, we extended our data structure assumption from 
d
Also, we stated that for this reason and for other considerations, which are
of a key lattice is the assumption of the existence of one or more parent node(s) 
for a single node in the key lattice. In the next section, we define our design 
principles for the second design attempt based on this assumption.  
 
4.6.1 Design Principles 
In section 4.3.1, we defined two design principles that we used for the first 
design attempt, namely, data-centric key establishment and derivation of 
blinded keys from a single parent key. For the second design attem
c
principle which is used 
more parent node(s) for a single node in the key lattice. 
 
Mixing of Blinded Keys from Multiple Parent Keys 
To define this design principle, we first have to define how we define the 
privacy levels of the subscribers group in poset as follows: 
 
Privacy Levels of Subscribers Groups: Accor
the set of subscribers at node b in poset has a higher privacy level, from 
the perspective of a given privacy dimension, tha
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subscribers at node a in poset only and only if b ⊇  a and both a, b 
hich are defined in terms of this privacy dimension.  
 
A very
assump
key est
commu
ey of one communicating entity. A key is generated for each intermediate node 
ey. And the process repeats until we reach the root node. In figure 
9, we illustrate an example OFT group key tree, where a group member at 
h we discuss in the next section. 
contain predicates w
 significant proposal of group key establishment which has similar 
tions about privacy levels is the One-Way Function Tree, OFT, group 
ablishment [35]. In OFT, a binary tree is built to represent a group of 
nicating entities. The key at a leaf node in this tree represents the private 
k
in the tree to be used for secure group communication of the entities at the 
branching leaf nodes from this intermediate node. The higher the level of the 
intermediate node, the lower the associated privacy level with its encryption 
key, and vice versa. OFT follows a bottom-up approach from group key 
generation.  
 
To build the OFT key tree, a one way function is applied to the key at each leaf 
node in the tree to get a blinded version of it. And then, the two blinded keys of 
two sibling nodes are combined using a combination function to produce their 
own group k
1
node M knows only the keys at the black nodes and the blinded keys at the gray 
nodes [35].   
 
From the perspective of our work, the important part is the ability to mix the 
keys of two nodes with a higher privacy level to produce the key of a single 
node with a lower level privacy. We utilize this feature in our second design 
attempt, whic
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 black 
 
ibute predicate in poset, the higher the privacy level of its 
ubscribers group, and vice versa. As a result, we may apply the design 
n a top-down approach instead of the 
 the case of one or more parent node(s) for a single node in the 
ey lattice. Basically, the extended key index concept must be useful for the 
 encryption keys from the parent nodes of a node in 
 
Fig.19. an example OFT group key tree, node M knows the keys at
nodes and the blinded key as the gray nodes [35]  
4.6.2 Poset Based Key Establishment 
According to Design Concept.3, the higher the level of a subscription node with 
privacy attr
s
principles in sections 4.3.1 and 4.6.1 i
bottom-up approach of OFT group key establishment [35], which we reviewed 
in section 4.6.2. 
 
Mixed Dotted Key Index 
At this point we extend the design concept of dotted key index in section 4.3.2 
to be suitable for
k
purpose of mixing blinded
the resulting key hierarchy to produce the key at this node. We define the 
concept of mixed dotted key index as follows: 
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, to node n. The mixed dotted key 
index of the encryption key at node n is defined as follows: 
i : e 
mixedKeyIndex (p)} 
m edKeyIndex(n) = mixedKeyIndexElement(n)  
mixedKeyIndexElement(n)  …  
Design Concept.4 
A Mixed Dotted Key Index at node n in a poset instance is the set of the 
associated key indices with every possible path from the root node of the 
poset, which can be an imaginary node
 
mixedKeyIndex(r) = {keyIndexElement(r) I } = {keyIndex(r)} = 
{ i r } 
 
, mixedKeyIndexElement(n) p  = {e  | ‘.’ | n ∈ 
 
, ix 0p ∪  
1p ∪  
mixedKeyIndexElement(n) pm 
 
, where r ∈  rootSet, the set of uncovered nodes in the poset, i is the 
string r f no e r
among the children of the poset root node, which may be any i nary
node, i he position f node  p decessor p, 
mixedKeyIndexElement(n is the set of inherited key indices by node n 
 
The ad
scheme
very im
mixed pt results into a unique key for each subscription node in 
oset. This feature is inherited from the uniqueness of the parent groups at each 
r
epresentation of the integer value of the position o d  
magi  
n among the children of its ren t
) p  
from any predecessor node p, keyIndex(x) is defined for any node x by 
Design Concept.1 as the dotted key index, m is the size of the 
predecessor set of node n.  The node label with mixed key index 0 is 
always the root node, and the operator ‘|’ defines the operation of string 
concatenation. 
vantage of defining the mixed key index is to provide a key labelling 
 which is compatible with the complete coverage relations in poset. It is 
portant to emphasize that the poset based key establishment using this 
key index conce
p
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of these nodes. An example of a key lattice with mixed key indices is illustrated 
in figure.20.  
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t the end of that review, we mentioned that we build our poset-based key 
establishmen eration of 
onnecting/disconnecting a subscription filter to/from its 
 for the purpose of not altering the original 
ll the elements in the key index of the parent node. The procedure 
 defined as follows: 
 
Fig.20. a key lattice with mixed dotted key indices 
Elementary Operations 
In section 4.4.2, we reviewed the procedure of subscription handling in poset. 
A
t scheme around the most elementary op
c
predecessors/successors. This is
poset operations. We define the effects of these connect/disconnect operations 
on the elements of the dotted key index in terms of the following elementary 
operations.  
 
First we define a procedure which generates a mixed key index element, for a 
newly connected child node, from the mixed key index, of a parent node. The 
procedure adds the position of the newly connected node, among its own 
children, to a
is
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ows: 
 
ement the numberOfChildren(p) by 1 
Procedure.7 
Let p be a node in a poset instance, and let n be a newly connected 
successor node to p, the procedure for generating 
mixedKeyIndexElement(n) p  as defined in Design Concept.4 can be 
descried as foll
1. Incr
2. For every e ∈  mixedKeyIndex(p): 
a. generate ne = e | ‘.’ | numberOfChildren(p) 
b. add ne to the set mixedKeyIndexElement(n) p  
3. Compute mixedKeyIndex(n) = mixedKeyIndex(n) 
ixedKeyIndexElement(n
∪  
m ) p  
4. For every c ∈  successors(n), call Procedure.8(c) 
, where numb es which 
have been add o
poset i
in the p
Secondly, we define the procedure which is called to update all the key indices 
of the s
o the key index of node n, then for an e c: 
2. If successors(e)
 
erOfChildren(x) represents the number of nod
ed to node x as children since the addition f x to the 
nstance and successors(x) is the set of successor nodes to node x 
oset instance. 
uccessor nodes to node n in Procedure.7: 
 
Procedure.8 
Let c be the set of successor nodes to node n in the poset. Once a new 
key element in added t ∈
 
1. Call Procedure.7(n ,e) 
 ≠ φ , then call Procedure.8(e) 
 
s  child 
node in it. 
  
 
, where successors(x) is the set of successor nodes to node x in the poset 
instance. And n is the parent node in Procedure.7 and e i  the
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Thirdly, we d
from a 
proced
rocedure.9 
Let p be a node in a poset instance, and let n be a connected successor 
efine the procedure which is called to remove a key index element 
given node in response to disconnecting it from a predecessor node. The 
ure is defined as follows: 
  
P
node to p, the procedure for removing the set of key elements 
mixedKeyIndexElement(n)  from the mixedKeyIndex(n) can be descried 
as follows: 
p
 
1. Compute mixedKeyIndex(n) = mixedKeyIndex(n) - 
mixedKeyIndexElement(n) p  
2. For every e ∈  predecessors(n) – {p}, call Procedure.7(e ,n) 
   
, where predecessors(x) is the set of predecessor nodes to node x in the 
poset instance. And e is the parent node in Procedure.7 and n is the 
child n
 
Finally, we d
mixed 
 
et mixedKeyIndex(n) be the mixed key index of a node n in a poset 
instance, then the process of generating encryptionKey(n) can be 
1. For every mixedKeyIndexElement(n  mixedKeyIndex (p) 
or every e  mixedKeyIndexElement(n)
te blindedKey = OWF(owfInput) 
ompute keyComponets = keyComponets {blindedKey} 
ode in it. 
efine the operation here of generating an encryption key from a 
key index as follows: 
Procedure.10 
L
defined as follows:  
  
) px ⊂
a. F  ∈ px
Compute u = u | removeCharacter(e, ‘.’) 
b. Compute owfInput = encryptionKey(p ) | u 
c. Compu
 
x
d. C  ∪
2. For every b ∈ keyComponets 
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mix
 
, where rem
c, ‘|’ defin
functio c ixing function, x XOR y is a 
possible su
 
After d
higher 
 
Handling Connecting/D
In poset, the two ways connection may connect two nodes of a node to another 
ode, i.e., the first node is an immediate predecessor to the second node, and the 
sult, 
’s enough that a key establishment process is done at the time of establishing 
stablishment is to be decided at 
n time.  
ode.  
Compute encryptionKey(n) = 
Function(encryptionKey(n), b) 
oveCharacter(s, c) returns the string s without the character 
es the string concatenation operation, OWF is a one way 
n, and mixFun tion(x, y) is a m
ggestion for it. 
efining this set of elementary operations, we move to the definitions of 
level operations around the connect/disconnect operations of poset. 
isconnecting Poset Nodes 
n
second node is an immediate successor to the first node. From the perspective 
of key establishment, this can be viewed as a one way connection. As a re
it
only one direction of this two ways connection. 
 
To keep the key establishment scheme at the lowest possible level, we use the 
above defined elementary operations when a node connects/disconnects to/from 
a predecessor node and when a node connects/disconnects to/from a successor 
node. However, because it is enough to establish a key for only one of these 
two cases, we leave the performing of the key e
ru
 
In particular, if the upward connection, i.e., from the successor node to the 
predecessor node, is done first, then the key establishment will be done at that 
time. In such case, no key establishment process will be done when the 
downward connection is established, i.e., from the predecessor node to the 
successor n
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ccessors for a predecessor node and the whole set of 
redecessors a successor node. We define the first procedure as follows: 
 
KeyIndexElement(n
Based on this logic, we define three procedures, which are called for a 
predecessor node or a successor node without any changes. The first one 
defines the connection process, the second one defines the disconnection 
process, and the last one defines the clearing process, i.e., the clearing of the 
whole set of su
p
 
Procedure.11 
Let p be a node in a poset instance, and let n be a successor node to p 
which is being connected to p, the procedure for updating the 
mixedKeyIndex (n), which is defined by Design Concept.4, can be 
descried as follows: 
If mixed ) p  ⊄mixedKeyIndex (n) , then   
Secondly, we define the procedure for handling the disconnecting of two nodes 
as follows: 
 
ssor 
 which is defined by Design Concept.4, 
s: 
 
KeyIndexElement(n  mixedKeyIndex (n) , then 
call Procedure.7(p ,n) 
 
, where p is the parent node in Procedure.7 and n is the child node. 
 
Procedure.12 
Let p be a node in a poset instance, and let n be a connected succe
node to p which is being disconnected from p, the procedure for 
updating the mixedKeyIndex(n)
can be descried as follow
If mixed ) p  ⊆
 call Procedure9(p ,n) 
 
, where p is the parent node in Procedure.9 and n is the child node. 
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Finally, we de  key 
elements which  predecessors/successors: 
 
1. If successors(n)
fine the procedure for handling the clearing the whole set of
 are inherited from/to all
Procedure.13 
Let n be a node in a poset instance, if node n is to be completely 
removed from its current position in poset, then: 
 
 ≠ φ , then 
very e , for e  successors (n), call Procedure.9(n ,e) ∈
2. If predecessors(n) ≠ φ , then 
, for every e ∈  predecessors (n), call Procedure.9(e ,n) 
, where de edure.9 is the parent node and the 
second pa h
 
In addition, we h m the 
perspective of the highest level operations in poset, namely, the addition of a 
new su
porta s at a Pub/Sub broker, which 
Design Concept.5  
is the start of a subscription addition/deletion 
/from a poset/forest instance. The ending point is the end of 
a subscription addition/deletion operation to/from a poset/ forest 
 
 
 the first passed no to Proc
ssed node is t e child node in it. 
define how t e last defined procedures are viewed fro
bscription and the deletion of an already existing one. This perspective is 
nt for the purpose of signalling subscriberim
maintains the considered poset instance in all defined operations in this section. 
 
For this purpose we define the concept of Atomic Update Round of the poset 
based key lattice: 
 
An Atomic Update Round is defined by a starting point and an ending 
point. The starting point 
operation to
instance.  
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During the update round, the poset/forest based key lattice is updated, 
in response to the dynamics of the poset/forest data structure. The round 
is atomic in the sense that no subscriber is updated with any key index 
or encryption key during it. Signalling is only done after the end of the 
round.  
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This co
operati
maintenance operations at the lowest level operations in the poset data 
structu
subscribers about their key indices and encryption keys from the details of the 
highest level operations of poset. 
The Set of To-Be-Signalled Subscribers is defined as follows: 
(n  subscribers(n
 
 in a poset instance with a modified mixed key index 
 update 
ound. A subscribers(n ) is the subscribers group to node n
 
In the above definition, it is imp  e in the 
poset with a m oup but not a modified mixed key index. 
This is
conflic
ections 4.6.4 and 4.6.5. 
ncept adds to the isolation of the key lattice maintenance from the poset 
ons. This isolation was initially achieved by defining the key 
re. And the definition of this concept isolates the signalling of 
 
At this point, we have to explain how the signalling is handled by our poset 
based key establishment. For this purpose, we define the concept of the set of 
the to-be-signalled subscribers as follows:  
 
Design Concept.6 
 
signallingSet = subscribers(n 0 ) ∪  subscribers(n 1 ) … ∪   
subscribers r ) …∪ n )  
, where n x is a node
and/or a modified subscribers group, after a single atomic
r nd x x . 
ortant to emphasize it considers any nod
odified subscribers gr
 important for the support of forward and backward security. However, it 
ts with the compatibility with the volatility principle; this is discussed in 
s
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To be able to apply the above defined design concept, we define two 
procedures. First, we define a procedure to update the keys for the nodes with 
modified subscribers groups but not modified mixed key indices. We refer to 
this process as the pre-signalling modification. We define this procedure as 
follows: 
  95
en the process of Pre-Signalling Modification for n is defined as 
ry e  predecessors(n), call Procedure.7(e ,n) 
de is the child node in it. 
 
Second we de c dated key 
indices: 
 
Let signallingSet be a set of to-be-signalled subscribers as defined in 
bscriber s, where s 
 
Procedure.14 
Let n be a node in a poset instance with a modified subscribers group 
and not a modified mixed key index after a single atomic update round,  
th
follows: 
 
For eve  ∈
 
, where predecessors(n) is the set of predecessor nodes to n. And the 
first passed node to Procedure.7 is the parent node and the second 
passed no
, fine the pro edure of signalling subscribers about up
Procedure.15 
Design Concept.6, then the key updates signalling process for a 
su ∈  signallingSet is defined as follows: 
 
1. Compute signallingSet = signallingSet – {s} 
cryptionKey = 
cret with s 
 
2. Set en
Procedure10(mixedKeyIndex(subscribedNode(s))) 
3. Send mixedKeyIndex(subscribedNode(s)) and encryptionKey 
to s, the sent message is encrypted by a shared se
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At this point, ption of the maintenance of mixed key 
indices in for ly inside one 
Pub/Sub brok
scheme can be use
vent Subscription and Key Maintenance at Local Brokers 
 we explain the handling of a subscription from SE to an event 
e is encrypted using a shared secret only 
etween SE and LB. In turn, LB sends an access-request message to ACE on 
entials from UE. 
lso, LB signals all the subscribers which 
e key indices associated with their own subscription nodes have been updated, 
we complete the descri
a poset instance. In other words, this happens on
er. In the next section, we define how this key establishment 
d in at the level of a privacy-aware Pub/Sub infrastructure.  
 
4.6.3 Usage 
In this section we explain how the poset based key establishment can be applied 
in the context of a privacy aware Pub/Sub infrastructure. In this section, we use 
definition listing.101 in section 4.3.3. 
 
E
In this point,
which contains a privacy variable of UE. In figure.21, an SE sends a message 
which contains its own access credentials and a subscription request to an event 
of UE to the nearest LB. This messag
b
behalf of the SE. This message includes the received cred
Assuming that SE is authorized to the requested subscription, ACE replies to LB 
with access-granted message. Public key cryptography can be used o secure the 
communication between ACE and LB.  
 
Afterwards, LB starts an Atomic Update Round, which is defined by Design 
Concept.5, to update its poset and its key lattice in response to the received 
subscription from SE. Then, LB sends to SE a message which contains the 
mixed key index and encryption key which are associated with the subscription 
node to which SE has just subscribed. A
th
during the atomic update round or during the pre signalling modification.  The 
signalling message from LB to any SE is encrypted with a shared secret only 
between SE and LB.  
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fo t 
based key lattice. In figure.22, ssible scenario of this process. 
or generality, we assume that an LB is a special case of IB. 
ted response from 
CE. As a rule, IB2 uses the keys in its poset based key lattice to encrypt events 
Fig.21. the sequence of handling user’s subscription in poset based key 
establishment 
Event Subscription and Key Maintenance at Intermediate Brokers 
Above, we explained how a subscription request is handled by an LB. We have 
also to consider how IB nodes, in the Pub/Sub network, should handle 
rwarded subscriptions from LB nodes, with respect to maintaining pose
we suggest a po
F
 
In figure.22, an intermediate broker IB1 forwards a subscription to IB2. The 
forwarding process is assumed to follow the rules of SIENA poset [8]. IB2 
handles the received subscription from IB1 in the same way as an LB handles a 
received subscription from an SE. The only different is that IB1 does not 
provide any access credentials to IB2 to get an access-gran
A
which will be forwarded to IB1. This may be utilized for privacy-aware 
encryption inside the broker network in case of no encryption underpinning to 
secure event dissemination among the Pub/Sub brokers.  
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rivacy-Aware Secure Event Multicasting 
t this point, we can explain the privacy-aware encryption at the Pub/Sub last 
mile. Simply, it is the same process as explained in figure.17 in section 4.3.3, 
w e 
perspective of redundan ussed in section 4.3.3, 
ere is a very significant difference, which we explain next.   
oset nodes. The 
ason is that the key lattice is based on the poset instance itself. In turn, 
Fig.22. Broker to broker subscription handling and event encryption in 
poset based key establishment 
 
P
A
ith the replacement of key indices with mixed key indices. However, from th
t encryptions issue that we disc
th
 
It’s very important to emphasize that a single attribute value in a single event is 
encrypted as many times as the number of the matching nodes in the 
poset/forest at the distributing LB. At each encryption time, a different 
encryption key may be used. As opposite to the case of the first design attempt, 
there is no redundancy in associated encryption keys with p
re
consistency among the key lattice and the subscription lattice naturally exist. 
This is an advantage which we emphasize in section 4.6.4; 
 
Handling Event Publications 
Finally, we explain the handling of publishing events of UE by a PE. Simply, it 
is the same process as explained in figure.18 in section 4.3.3, with the 
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E to the nearest LB. 
 turn, the LB sends an access-request message to ACE on behalf of the PE. 
ived credentials from UE. Assuming that PE is 
ds the encrypted event and its mixed key index to the neighbour IB. 
s an SE from the perspective of LB, IB is able to decrypt the received event. 
rting points for the third design attempt. We specify 
is analysis in the following points: 
et based key establishment, starting from 
IENA poset, which is featured by it generality in representing coverage 
replacement of key indices with mixed key indices. A PE sends a message 
which contains its own access credentials and an event of U
In
This message includes the rece
authorized to publish events about UE, ACE replies to LB with access-granted 
message.  
 
At this point there are two possibilities; first if we apply the previously 
proposed privacy-aware encryption inside the broker network, then LB uses the 
associated mixed key index to a matched poset node, with the being published 
event, to retrieve the encryption key. Then, LB encrypts the privacy in the event 
and forwar
A
Of course, in case of the existence of a symmetric encryption underpinning, it’s 
used to secure the event dissemination starting from any LB which functions as 
an access point to any PE. 
 
4.6.4 Analysis 
In this section, we analyse our proposal in the second design attempt. This 
analysis shows both the advantages and the disadvantages of poset based key 
establishment mechanism in this attempt. We conclude a significant 
improvement for it and sta
th
 
Generality of Key Lattices and Completeness of Poset 
In section 4.3.4, we concluded the requirement of starting the key establishment 
process from a data structure which represents the coverage relations among the 
different values of a privacy dimension in a generalized form. In our second 
design attempt, we proposed the pos
S
relationships.  
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s, we conclude that the proposed poset based key establishment 
 this design attempt is generalized enough to represent any privacy dimension 
key establishment is built around the most 
lementary poset operations. As a result, the poset based key establishment 
ird design attempt; more details are in 
ection 4.8. 
 it. This is mainly to address the problem of redundant encryptions 
ue to the inconsistency between the key hierarchy, of the first design attempt, 
des. 
resentation, 
 not an issue any more. This is a main advantage of the proposal in this design 
attempt. 
Also, we defined the concepts of reflected privacy rule, i.e., Design Concept.2, 
and privacy levels of subscribers groups, Design Concept.3. Based on the 
definition of the coverage relation in poset, in section 4.4, and these two 
concept design
in
lattice, which is a main advantage.  
 
On the other hand, the coverage relation in poset is described as a complete one, 
i.e. a node is connected to every immediate predecessor node or immediate 
successor node, this results into high computational costs of poset operations. 
At the same time, our poset based 
e
inherits this complexity from the poset.  
 
Consequently, if it’s possible to build the key establishment scheme around 
another data structure which provides the same coverage property as that of 
poset but with lower complexity, then this will be a significant alternative.  This 
conclusion is the starting point of our th
s
 
Reflected Dimension Lattice based on Subscription Lattice  
In section 4.3.4, we concluded the requirement of moving the key establishment 
process to the side of subscription lattice, so that the key hierarchy will be a 
reflection of
d
at the ACE side and the subscription lattice at the side of LB no
 
In the second design attempt, we started the key establishment process from the 
subscription lattice itself, i.e., poset. This totally complies with the above 
mentioned requirement. In particular, the consistency among the key data 
structure and the subscription data structure, regardless of their rep
is
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ture, i.e., after a single atomic update round. Also, we defined that the 
oset based key lattice is modified in response to any changes in the subscribers 
roups at poset nodes which did not experience any changes in its predecessors 
In particular, we 
atible solution. However, in our third design attempt we 
onsider this issue from the beginning; more details are in section 4.8. 
 at local 
rokers for the purpose of generating privacy aware keys for subscribers group. 
t the Pub/Sub network level.  
 
 
Forward and Backward Security vs. Volatility Compatibility  
In our second design attempt, we proposed that the signalling of subscribers, 
about their updated key indices, is done in response to the changes of the poset 
data struc
p
g
or successors sets, i.e., during the last atomic update round. 
defined this as the pre-signalling modification. 
 
Finally, we defined of the set of To-be-signalled subscribers to contain the 
subscribers to any node with a modified mixed key index, regardless of the 
reason of its modifications. It is clear that the proposed scheme considers any 
possible change in a subscribers group, which is a direct support of forward and 
backward security.  
 
On the other hand, this feature contradicts with the volatility principle when the 
mixed index key of a node in the poset is modified while the subscribers group 
of this node is the same at the start and the end of the atomic update round. In 
section 4.6.5, we propose an extension to our poset based key establishment to 
be a volatility comp
c
 
Fault Tolerant Clustered Key Management 
In section 3.5.2, we discussed how our planning to move the key establishment 
process to the local Pub/Sub brokers makes use of clustering subscribers around 
their own local brokers to achieve fault tolerance from the perspective of the 
whole Pub/Sub network. In section 4.3.4, we used poset instances
b
This solution complies with the fault tolerance a
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er 
of key update messages and minimizing the number of distribution encryption 
operations  which are required for the sending the key update messages.  
 
Minimizing the Number of Key Update Messages 
For the first purpose, we start by defining the design concept of Mixed Key 
Indices Queues: 
 
Design Concept.7 
A Queue of Mixed Key Indices at node n in a poset instance contains a 
set of mixed key indices. An element of this queue is defined as 
mixedKeyIndex(n) , where t represents the ascending temporal order of 
creating the mixed key indices for node n. A consistent key lattice is 
formed by all last elements in the queues of mixed key indices at all 
nodes in the poset instance.  
 
Then, we define the concept of the minimal set of the to-be-signalled 
subscribers as follows:  
 
Design Concept.8 
A Minimal Set of To-Be-Signalled Subscribers is defined as follows: 
 
minSignallingSet = subscribers(n ) …  subscribers(n )…
subscribers(n ) 
 
,where n is a node in a poset instance with a modified mixed key index 
as well as a modified subscribers group after a single atomic update 
round. And subscribers(n ) is the set of subscribers to node n  in the 
poset instance. 
 
4.6.5 Volatility Compatible Poset Based Key Establishment 
In this section, we propose a modification to our proposal of poset based key 
establishment to address the issue of volatility compatibility, which we raised in 
section 4.6.4. We handle this issue at two axes, namely, minimizing the numb
t
0 ∪ r ∪  
n
x  
x x
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lled subscribers, 
alling 
odification; more details are in section 4.6.3. 
ity compatible key updates signalling. This is defined in the 
llowing procedure: 
This way, we shrink the definition of the set of the To-be-signa
that we defined in section 4.6.3, by excluding the subscribers to any node with a 
modified mixed key index but with the same subscribers group, i.e., at the start 
and the end of the same atomic update round. It is important to note that the 
modification of mixed key indices can be due to modifications during the last 
atomic update round or due to modifications during as the pre-sign
m
 
Finally, we define how the above defined two concepts are used together to 
provide a volatil
fo
 
Procedure.16 
Let minSignallingSet be a minimal set of to-be-signalled subscribers as 
defined in Design Concept.8, and let be queueMixedKeyIndices(n) be 
the queue of mixed key indices of a node n, in a poset instance, as 
defined in Design Concept.7, then the key updates signalling process for 
a subscriber s, where s ∈  minSignallingSet and s ∈  subscribers(n), 
efined as follows: 
te minSignallingSet = minSignallingSet – {s} 
2. If subscribers(n)
d
 
1. Compu
 ∩  minSignallingSet = φ ,  then 
MixedKeyIndex =  
else 
getFirstElement(queueMixedKeyIndices(n)) 
. Set newEncryptionKey = Procedure.10 (newMixedKeyIndex) 
bers(x) is the set of subscribers to node x in the poset 
instance, removeFirstElement(Q) returns and removes the first element 
set new
removeFirstElement(queueMixedKeyIndices(n)) 
set newMixedKeyIndex =  
3
4. Send newMixedKeyIndex and newEncryptionKey to s, the 
update message is encrypted by a shared secret with s 
 
, where subscri
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ress the issue of efficient group 
ey distribution to the minimal set of to-be-signalled subscribers.  
 every node in the poset as a single group key, from the 
perspective of key hierarchies this key is the key at the top of the hierarchy. 
Then the local Pub/Sub broker is responsible for maintaining a key hierarchy 
under t
keys in
are use
instanc
 
In this section, we introduced an improvement of the poset based key 
establishment to make it volatility compatible. In the next section we review 
forest, the cor  target to 
make volatility i east storage, 
and of course comp
 
4.7 Poset Derived Forest 
Avoiding the comp operation in poset was a main 
motivation to the xt of our work, 
namely forest  
stores filters a
from poset in that 
from queue Q, and getoveFirstElement(Q) returns the first element of 
queue Q without removing it. 
 
Minimizing the Number of Encryption Operations for Key Distribution 
At this point, we minimize the number of key update messages. Next we 
minimize the number of encryption keys which are required for the sending the 
key update messages. For this purpose we add
k
 
In section 3.2.2, we reviewed key hierarchies for efficient group key 
distribution. We view
his group key, i.e. the root of the hierarchy is not computed. Sub-group 
 this hierarchy change base only on the group dynamics. Sub-group keys 
d for efficient distribution of the key at the considered node in the poset 
e. 
e data structure of our third design attempt, which we
 compatible from the design phase, and w th the l
utational, costs. 
utational cost of the add 
other proposal that we consider in the conte
[37, 38]. Similar to poset, forest is a generic data structure which
ccording to their coverage relationships [37, 38]. Forest differs 
each node may have only one immediate predecessor.  
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4.7.1 F
A fores
ilter Coverage in Forest 
t is defined as follows:  
 
Definiton.2 
“Given F as a finite set of filters and ⊇as a coverage relation, a pair 
(F,⊇ ) is an X-derived forest, if  
1. F ⊂  X, X is a poset, F finite. 
2. For each a ∈  F there is at most one b ∈F for which b a, i.e. 
(F,
 ⊇
⊇ ) is a forest with the relation  going from child to ⊆
parent. 
3. If a, b ∈  F and b ⊇a, then a < b in X. 
The set F is called the base set of (F,⊇ ) and the set of all X-derived 
forests is  
denoted DF X .” [37]. 
 
From the forest definition, we can clearly notice that a filter in the forest can’t 
have more than one parent. Consequently, although there may exist a coverage 
lation between two filters a and c in the case of poset, it is possible that a will 
matching events notifications, i.e. by traversing 
tilized 
for minimal subscribes group key updates, which is an important feature for 
large sized and highly dynamic subscribes groups.  
 
re
not be inserted under c in the forest because a can be inserted in the forest under 
another filter b. Forest has other definitions and considerations, e.g. maximal 
poset-derived forest and sibling purity [37], however for the purpose of our 
work we only focus on the principal idea of forest, which is defined by the 
above definition.  
 
If we consider using forest for 
the data structure from starting from the filters at the root of the data structure, 
this one immediate predecessor constraint dose not conflict with this matching 
functionality. It’s also utilized by the forest subscription addition operation to 
achieve less computational costs than the addition operation in the case of poset 
[37, 38]. From the perspective of our work this one parent constrain is u
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orest 
d deletion operation of a subscription filter as 
llows: 
 
“  We assume that there is an easy way 
to ge n to “larger” and 
“sma e e  X
define fo
output an X-derived forest: 
add r o
lse if x is incomparable with all roots of the current level, 
 x  singleton tree. 
3. Else if x is larger than some root of the current level, update 
nt level. In this an element of C carries the whole subtree 
rooted at it with the addition” [2]. 
In the next section we start 
ur third design attempt.  
4.7.2 Subscription Handling in F
Forest defines it is addition an
fo
Procedure.17 
Let (F,w) be an X-derived forest.
t at a y node in F from its name. All references 
ller” are to b  taken with respect to th  relation w on . We 
the llowing algorithms with inputs F and some x 2 X and 
Set the cur ent level t  the roots of F. 
1. If x is already in the forest, return without doing anything. 
2. E
add  as a new
the current level by making x a root of a new tree with 
children being all previous roots that are smaller than x. 
4. Else pick a tree whose root is larger than x, set the current 
level to be this root’s children and repeat this procedure from 
step 2. 
del Let C be the set of children of x and S be the set of siblings of x. 
Then, run add for each of the elements of C, starting with S as the 
curre
 
Compared to the addition and deletion operations of the poset, these two 
operations in the forest are very simple and efficient [2]. From the perspective 
of our work, addition and deletion operations of forest share the lower level 
operations of connecting and disconnecting nodes in the forest. We view these 
operations as the most elementary operations than we build our key 
establishment around them. This is for the purpose of not altering the higher 
level forest operations, i.e., addition and deletion. 
o
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ng Dimension Lattices to Key 
 section 4.6.4, we concluded the requirement of starting the key establishment 
scheme from another data structure which provides the same coverage property 
as that o
4.7, the f
matching
decisions
relations d Definition.2. 
 
From another lity 
compatibility 
number of key rs nodes and minimizing the 
number of en
messages. A sim
starting from the 
 
In this section w
attempt. This proposal has very similar design principles, operations, and usage 
scenario 
respect to com
it is designed
given privacy  data structure assumption of 
section 4.5, i.e. the reflected rules lattice.  
4.8 Third Design Attempt: Mappi
Forests 
In
f poset but with lower computational costs. As we reviewed in section 
orest has more simple and efficient operations that of forest, while 
 and event against its nodes results into the same event forwarding 
 as those of poset. This is because they provide the same coverage 
as reviewed in Definition.1 an
perspective, in section 4.6.5, we handled the issue of volati
for our second design attempt at two axes, namely, minimizing 
update messages to subscribe
cryptions which are required for the sending the key update 
ilar strategy will be followed in our third design attempt but 
design phase, as we concluded in section 4.6.4. 
e propose the forest based key establishment, our third design 
to the previous two attempts. It is designed to be lightweight with 
putations costs for key establishment and key distribution. Also, 
 to provide the flexibility of expressing any coverage relations of a 
 dimension. It assumes the second
 
4.8.1 Design Principles 
In section 4.3.1, we defined a set of design principles that we used for the first 
design attempt, namely, data-centric key establishment and derivation of 
blinded keys from a single parent key. For the third design attempt, we only 
consider these two design principles; there are no additional considerations. 
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In this section, we start our third design attempt, forest based key establishment. 
We start by the reasoning behind the conclusion of the central design concept of 
ey indices, i.e. with the 
ixed key index at any node is the latest update from its current parent, is not 
ower level key 
 order to be able to decrypt the received event. In such scheme, encryption 
olatility compatible version of the 
econd design attempts, in section 4.6.4. 
ons 
cost of updating the key indices was not eliminated and additional storage costs 
are required for the queue of mixed key indices. 
4.8.2 Forest Based Key Establishment 
this proposal, i.e. inconsistent key index. 
 
Event Encryption/Decryption and Consistency of Key Indices  
In sections 4.3.3 and 4.6.3, we notice that when an LB, as defined Definition 
Lisitng.1, encrypts an event with the associated encryption key with a matched 
node in poset in order to multicast that event to the set of subscribers at that 
node. This mans that, a key lattice with consistent k
m
necessary for the this kind of encryption.  
 
In other words, encryption and decryption are independent of the consistency of 
the key indices. This is opposite to proposal in [4] where an event is encrypted 
using the lowest level node in the key hierarchy. In turn, a receiver node with a 
key at a higher level in the hierarchy must be able to derive the l
in
and decryption are dependent on the consistency of the key indices 
 
Overhead of Maintaining Consistent Key Indices 
From another perspective, maintaining the consistency of the key indices results 
into two overhead costs. The first is the computations cost of updating the key 
indices in the key lattice itself. This cost is not eliminated for any of the 
previous design attempts, even in the v
s
 
The second cost is the cost of unnecessary sending of key update messages to 
subscribers to nodes with no changes in the subscribers group. This issue is 
mainly regarding the second design attempt, as discussed in section 4.6.4. We 
proposed a solution for this issue in section 4.6.5, however the computati
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, we propose the following design 
oncept: 
To address the two above mentioned issues, we make use of the above 
mentioned notice of the independency of encryption/decryption of the 
consistency of the key indices. In turn
c
 
Design Concept.9 
An Inconsistent Key Index at node n, in a forest instance, is defined as 
keyIndex(n), which is defined by Design Concept.1. It is inconsistent 
because: 
 
keyIndex(p) ⊄  keyIndex(n) 
 
ccording to this design concept, in a forest based key lattice it is not necessary 
y index of its current parent 
s of addition and deletion of a node in 
e forest data structure. Also, we mentioned that the operations of connecting 
, where p is the current parent of nod n in the forest instance, and 
according to the definition forest of filter coverage in forest, 
Defintinon.2 in this text, it’s not possible that node n can use 
keyIndex(n) to derive keyIndex(p), which is a correctness property for 
the forest based key lattice. 
 
A
that the key index of node n is derived from the ke
node in the forest instance. Next, we define the operations the forest based key 
establishment. 
 
Handling Connecting/Disconnecting Forest Nodes  
In section 4.7, we reviewed the operation
th
and disconnecting nodes, during addition and deletion of forest, are the most 
elementary operations which we build our forest based key establishment 
around.   
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ned concept of inconsistent key index, we define the 
ocedure.17 
Let n be a newly added child node to node p in a forest instance. Then 
computed from keyIndex(p) as follows 
a. Increment the numberOfChildren(p) by 1  
b. Define keyIndex(n) = keyIndex(p) | numberOfChildren (p) 
c. Compute y( re.2(keyIndex(n)) 
 
 
In addition, we define a procedure for updating the key indices of nodes with 
nly a changed subscribers group and not changed key index after the last 
 a node in a forest instance with a modified subscribers group 
and not a modified key index after a single atomic update round,  then 
 n is defined as follows: 
d for Procdure.17 the first passed is the parent node in it and the 
second part is the child node in it. 
 
 
Considering the above defi
following procedure for creating a key index for a node in forest upon 
connecting it to a parent node: 
 
Pr
keyIndex(n) can be 
 
If length(keyIndex(n)) = 0, then 
encryptionKe n) =  Procedu
, where length(s) returns the number of characters in string s, 
numberOfChildren(x) is the number of children nodes connected to 
node x in the poset instance. 
o
atomic update round, which is defined by Design Concept.5.  
 
Procedure.18 
Let n be
the process of Pre-Signalling Modification for
 
For every p = parentNode(n), call Procedure.17(p ,n) 
 
, where parentNode(x) is parent node of node x in the forest instance 
an
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 if it’s necessary to generate a key index. In 
particular, when a node with no key index is added as a child of another node or 
when the subscribers group of a node changes without changing its key index 
after th
subscri
Proced
Let signa rs as defined in 
Design C  
subscribe
Minimal Key Index Generation per Atomic Update Round 
From the above two defined procedures, we notice that the generation of key 
indices is done only and only
e last atomic update round. We define the procedure of signalling 
bers about the updates of key indices as follows: 
 
ure.19 
llingSet be a set of to-be-signalled subscribe
oncept.6, then the key updates signalling process for a
r s, where s ∈  signallingSet is defined as follows: 
 
cribedNode(s)) to s, the sent message is 
encrypted by a shared secret with s 
 
To com our proposal of forest based key establishment, only a 
single 
efficien
used t  
encryption operations. 
 
4.8.3 Usage 
In sect
is used
differs  one by just the used data structure 
hich, i.e. forest in the first case and poset in the second one. No more 
xplanation is required than of section 4.6.3. 
1. Compute signallingSet = signallingSet – {s} 
2. Send keyIndex(subscribedNode(s)) and 
encryptionKey(subs
 
, where subscribedNode(s) returns the node in the forest to which 
subscriber s is currently subscribing. 
pletely define 
functionality can be added to the above defined procedures, namely, 
t group key distribution using key hierarchies in the same manner as we 
hem in section 4.6.5, for minimizing the number of distribution
ion 4.6.3, we explained how the poset based key establishment proposal 
 in a Pub/Sub infrastructure. The usage of forest based key establishment 
from the usage of the poset based
w
e
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section 4.4, and from our review of forest, in section 4.7, we conclude that 
proposal of forest based key establishment inherits a number of advantages 
from th
 
Firstly, e key lattice 
to represent any dimension lattice, which represent the user specified privacy 
rules from the dly, forest based 
key establishm  key lattice and the 
subscription latt nt 
encryptions are possible while encrypting for a secure multicasting. Finally, 
forest based key establishment inherits the fault tolerant clustered key 
manage
canters
 
tion per atomic update Round 
 section 4.8.2. In turn, we conclude that forest based key establishment is a 
osal for a privacy aware key establishment in a ubiquitous Pub/Sub 
4.8.4 Analysis 
Finally, we analyse our proposal of forest based key establishment. We specify 
this analysis in the following points: 
 
Inherited Advantages from Poset Based Key Establishment 
In section 4.6.4, we analysed the poset based key establishment, our proposal in 
the second design attempt. From that analysis and from our review of poset, in 
e poset based proposal. 
 forest based key establishment inherits the generality of th
perspective of a given privacy dimension. Secon
ent inherits the consistency among the
ice, which is forest in this case. In turn, no redunda
ment, which is achieved by trusting Pub/Sub brokers to act as key 
 for their local subscribers.  
Volatility Compatible Forward and Backward Security 
Forest based key establishment goes beyond the inherited advantages form 
poset based key establishment by one more important advantage, namely, 
supporting volatility compatible forward and backward security. This feature is 
clearly defined by the minimal key index genera
in
suitable prop
infrastructure. 
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tation and Results  
ted visualization tools to visualize the 
sulting key hierarchies/lattices. Finally, we discuss  
e defined by Design Concept.4. Also, we 
plemented all the associated elementary operations and the nodes connecting 
pt.1, was simply implemented as an array of 
tegers. The code of both prototypes is based on the implementation of poset 
 this thesis is 
4.9 Implemen
In this section, we introduce the design attempts which we implemented 
prototypes for. Also, we implemen
re
 
4.9.1 Implementation and Data Structures 
As proofs of concept, we implemented two prototypes. The first prototype is an 
implementation of the poset based key establishment which we introduced in 
section 4.6.2. In this implementation, we focus on implementing the mixed 
dotted key index, which w
im
and disconnecting operations in section. In figure.23, we illustrate the data 
structure for representing the mixed dotted key index {2.2.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1} of a 
node which is the first child to both its parents {2.2} and {3.1, 4.1}. 
 
The second prototype is an implementation of the forest based key 
establishment which we introduced in section 4.8.2.  The implementation is 
simple because of the minimal key index generation feature of forest based key 
establishment. Also, the data structure for representing the dotted key index, 
which we defined by Design Conce
in
and forest of the fuego core project [41]. All the implementation is
done in Java. 
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ation of Key Hierarchies/Lattices 
 addition we developed two visualization tools, one for visualising the 
resulting key lattices of the poset based key establishment and the other for 
visualising the resulting inconsistent key hierarchies from the     forest based 
key establishment. In addition to the purpose of visualization, these two tools 
have been very useful for debugging the implementations, by verifying the 
visualized results against the expected ones. But in the case of poset based key 
establishment, formal correctness properties were defined to test its results. This 
is because of the complexity of this scheme makes testing it using the usual 
software debugging mechanism and the visualisation based debugging not 
sufficient.  
Fig.23. the data structure of a mixed dotted key index 
 
4.9.2 Visualiz
In
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poset. Opp ualization 
ol shows the key hierarchy under the node with mixed key index {138} which 
vious screen shot. 
In figure 24 a screen shot from the visualization tool of results of the forest 
based key establishment shows an example inconsistent key hierarchy under 
node with key index 90 which is part of the whole key forest. Horizontal and 
vertical scrolling can be used to reveal its other parts. 
Fig.24. a result inconsistent key indices hierarchy from forest based key 
establishment 
In figure 25, a screen shot of the visualization tool of the poset based key 
hierarchy shows the node with mixed key index {156.1, 138.1, 144.3, 167.3.1, 
163.4.1, 167.11.2} and its parents along all the paths to the uncovered set of the 
ositely, in figure 26, another screen shot of the same vis
to
is a parent to the target node in figure 25 in the pre
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Fig.26. children of node {138} 
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m
Finally, in figure 27 three screen shots show the sequence of updating a simple 
ixed key indices lattice. The screen shout with label 1 shows the initial state, a 
trivial configuration of one parent one child totally ordered set.  
Then, the screen shot with label 2 shows the change in the key lattice after 
deleting the second node, with subscriber i10, third node with subscriber i20 
replaces the removed node as the first child of the root node wit subscriber i0. 
As a result, this root node generates a new key index {1.2} for the newly added 
child, a change which is reflected to all subsequent nodes.  
Finally, in screen shot with label 3, a new subscriber i3 subscribes to the second 
node, which asks the parent for a new key index {1.3} to preserve backward 
security. Again, subsequent nodes are updated. This consistency in the key 
indices lattice in poset based key establishment is optimized in section 4.6.5 to 
inimize the number of required signalling messages to involved subscribers. 
 
 
m
 
Fig.27. Consistent key indices lattices and forward/backward security 
Chapter 4                                                         Privacy-Aware Key Establishment 
  118
 resulting key 
ierarchies valid for any further type of testing. We list the correctness testing 
s and associated key 
indices, to an original poset instance, without the additional key 
 
4.9.3 Correctness Testing of Poset Based Key Establishment 
We define four correctness tests which must be passed by our implementation 
of the poset based key establishment in order to consider the
h
as follows:  
 
a. Original Poset Consistency Test 
This test compares the current status of a key generating poset 
instance, with added key establishment operation
establishment operations or associated key indices. The comparison is 
done as on a node by node basis, where a node in the key generation 
poset instance is compared to a node in the original poset instance 
only and only if they are associated with the same subscription, i.e. 
the same set of filters.  
To pass the test, the key generation poset instance must have the same 
number of uncovered nodes as well as the same total number of nodes 
as the original poset instance. In addition, each node in the key 
generation poset must have the same sets of predecessors and 
successors at those of the comparable node in the original poset 
instance. 
 
b. Key Index Consistency Test 
To pass this test, each node in the key generating poset instance must 
inherit every key element at every current parent node. Simply, the 
test checks whether every key element in every current parent node is 
a substring of a key element in the mixed key of the node under test. 
A key element in the mixed key index of the node under test is used 
for only once as an including string of a key element of a parent node. 
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c. Signal List Correctness Test 
During the key indices maintenance operations, we continuously 
update a list of the nodes in the poset with updated key indices. This 
test checks the correctness of this list. To do so, the test records the 
values of the key indices at the start of a given atomic update round. 
Then the test records the values of the key indices at the end of the 
atomic update round. Finally, the test compares the key indices values 
at the start of the round to those at its end. As a result, it builds a list 
of the nodes with differences in their key indices. This list should be 
the same at the built list during the key indices maintenance.  
 
The importance of this test comes from the reality that we modify 
existing poset implementation to add the key generation functionality. 
And we want to make sure that our implementation policy at lower 
level operations does not miss any of the key updates from the 
perspective of higher level operations, i.e. add and delete poset 
 of nodes with changed interfaces. 
operations which are bounded by the atomic update round. 
 
d. Interfaces Change List Correctness Test  
It is a similar test to the previously defined one, i.e., signal list 
correctness test. The only difference is that it tests the correctness of a 
list
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In this c
extension  in section 
4.6.2. This extension may provide content based routing mechanism for 
encryp  it’ll be can be a major 
contributi
 
5.1 Con
sis, we investigated the problem of generating encryption keys to 
ecure event distribution to subscribers groups in Pub/Sub infrastructure for the 
ubiquitous environments. We focused on Pub/Sub because its interaction 
decoupling makes it a very significant candidate as a ubiquitous interaction 
paradigm. The volatile and error prone ubiquitous environment was studied in 
order to collect its requirements from the perspective of middleware 
infrastructures, e.g. Pub/Sub. In addition, we reviewed the literature for the 
current provided support by Pub/Sub to the requirements of ubiquitous 
infrastructures.  
 
From all of these reviews, we concluded that Pub/Sub has been strengthened by 
proposals for defining and enforcing privacy policies in ubiquitous 
environments. Also, encrypting the disseminated events has been investigated 
for Pub/Sub by different approaches, which address the security requirements 
of the ubiquitous environments. However, the privacy and security 
underpinnings for Pub/Sub in ubiquitous environments were given a small 
intersection area, while they are much tied aspects to each other. So we had to 
investigate how to create encryption keys which reflect the privacy levels 
specified by the privacy rules in the ubiquitous infrastructures. 
 
Consequently, the problem of generating encryption keys for subscribers groups 
in Pub/Sub infrastructures was investigated. Of course this is with the 
considerations of the dynamic and large group of subscribers in the ubiquitous 
environments. In turn, we concluded the problem definition as a group key 
establishment problem for dynamic and large groups, and several factors and 
hapter, we conclude the thesis. In addition, we introduce a possible 
 of the poset based key establishment, which we introduced
ted events, which if proved to be practical
on to the secure event routing in Pub/Sub systems.  
clusion 
In this the
s
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design consideration were investigated. r design attempts to 
solve the defined problem by addressing
 
Afterwards, we started the first design attempt assuming that the key 
establishment is done by the same entity which maintains the privacy rules. By 
analysis, we concluded that we have to ove the key establishment process to 
the local Pub/Sub brokers which receive subscriptions from clients. So, we 
started our second design attempt by m pping privacy dimensions at attributes 
in the poset instances incised the local Pub/Sub brokers. Finally, due to the 
complex operation in poset, which is ce unsuitable overhead 
with respect to the volatility of the ubiquitous environments, we started our 
third and last design attempt using forest. The analysis of the forest based key 
establishment mechanisms shows a inimal number of operations, i.e. 
overhead, which is suitable thesis. However, the poset 
based key establishment from  work, which we discuss in 
the next section. 
 
5.2 Fu
 this section we introduce a possible extension of the poset based key 
establishment, which we proposed in section 4.6.2. The extension is targeted as 
a contribution to the secure event routing in Pub/Sub systems.  
Firstly, we start by introducing our assumptions about handling user’s privacy 
in entrusted Pub/Sub brokers’ network. Secondly, we define our concept of 
secure event routing using mixed key indices. 
 
5.2.1 Handling User Privacy in Entrusted Publish/Subscribe Brokers 
Network 
In a ubiquitous environment, trust relationships between clients, e.g. subscriber 
mobile nodes, from one side and service providers, e.g. Pub/Sub brokers, from 
another side must be pre-established – by direct or indirect means [39]. In 
particular, mutual authentication between a client and a service should be 
established before accessing the service. Such authentication mainly requires at 
  Then we started ou
 the concluded design considerations. 
 m
a
expected introdu
m
for the purpose of this 
 the basis of our future
ture Work 
In
Chapter 5                                                                Conclusion and Future Work 
  123
user’s privacy. At 
is point, traditional authentication mechanisms fail to work in the ubiquitous 
his is similar to the case for cellular networks [32], which 
tication process. The scheme is an application layer one and it 
oes not depend on any underlying security infrastructure. 
nt based routing 
 Pub/Sub infrastructures. We make use of the poset based key establishment 
section 3.4.6. In particular, we map a User Entity, UE, to any Pub/Sub user 
least a piece of information about the user’s identity. It my even require 
information about the user’s location or other context information.  
 
In case of entrusted service providers, e.g. entrusted Pub/Sub brokers, the 
access to such pieces of information may contradict with the 
th
environment [39]. T
we reviewed in section 3.4.6. In most cases, from the perspective of a service, it 
is only enough to know whether a client with a particular context is authorized 
for access or not, and not the exact information about the client. 
 
Privacy preserving authentication has been proposed for the ubiquitous 
environments [39]. The proposed scheme employs blinded signature, which is a 
variant of the digital signature, and hash chains, which applies one-way hash 
computation, to protect the identity of a client from being revealed to a service 
during the authen
d
 
Assuming the existence of such privacy-aware authentication scheme in a 
ubiquitous Pub/Sub infrastructure, we propose a possible extension to our poset 
based key establishment in the next section. We assume that this extension is a 
significant part of the contribution of this thesis. 
 
5.2.2 Secure Event Routing in Entrusted Publish/Subscribe Brokers 
Network 
In this section, we describe a possible scenario of secure conte
in
scheme, the proposal of our second design attempt in section 4.5. 
 
Scenario Entities  
Firstly we define the interacting entities and their roles based on the proposal 
for privacy-aware security for cellular networks [32], which we reviewed in 
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a 
ew node which we introduce to the Pub/Sub infrastructure, namely, the 
 
entity, i.e., publisher or subscriber. In addition, we map a Serving home Entity, 
SE, to any entrusted Pub/Sub broker. Finally, we map a Home Entity, HE, to 
n
Cluster Head Broker. 
 
A Cluster Head Broker, CHB, is a member of a trusted sub-network of Pub/Sub 
brokers. This sub-network is referred to as the Trusted Core. This sub-network 
forms a security management layer above other network in the same Pub/Sub 
network. Each CHB is responsible for maintaining the poset data structure as 
well as its derived key lattice for the subscribers at the set of entrusted Pub/Sub 
brokers which belong to its own cluster. A CHB is assumed to have a 
synchronized copy of the poset and the poset based key lattice of every other 
member of the trusted core. Clustering of brokers is assumed to be location 
based. In figure.28, we show a Pub/Sub network with the entities which we 
define in this section. 
 
Fig.28. secure event routing using poset based mixed key indices 
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ted Pub/Sub 
frastructure. A UE uses a privacy aware authentication process, similar to 
 the first case, UE sends an encrypted subscription to the CHB via the SE. The 
d key index update 
essages are confidentially protected in a way which ensures efficient group 
he Projection of Cluster Heads to the Entrusted Brokers 
proje  of mixed key indices. This data structure contains subset of the 
o have a less 
umber of elements in its mixed index than that of its child node. In addition, 
hich satisfy the first condition, the mixed key index of the 
User Authentication at Entrusted Brokers 
Secondly, we define the scenario of secure event routing in entrus
in
that we reviewed in section 5.2, to register to the nearest SE, i.e., the local 
entrusted Pub/Sub broker. The SE asks the CHB for access permission to the 
UE. After getting the access permission, there are two cases. In the first case, 
UE is an authorised subscriber, and in the second one, UE is an authorised 
publisher. 
 
Handling Subscriptions at Entrusted Brokers 
In
subscription is encrypted by a shared secret only by the UE and the CHB. In 
turn, the CHB updates its own subscription lattice and poset based key lattice to 
reflect the received subscription. Then, the CHB sends the mixed key index, 
which is associated with the node of the received subscription in it’s the CHB 
poset instance, to both of the SE and the UE. It also sends the associated 
encryption key to the UE. All of these key update an
m
key distribution to the involved groups of SE nodes and UE nodes. Finally, the 
CHB synchronizes the copies of its poset and poset based key lattice at the other 
members of the trusted core. 
 
T
Upon receiving the mixed key index from the CHB, the SE updates its own 
cted lattice
mixed key indices in the key lattice at the CHB. It is formed by directly 
connecting each of these mixed key indices as a child to a parent mixed key 
index node. The first condition of selecting a parent node is t
n
among all nodes w
selected parent node must have the largest number of common elements with 
key index of the child node.  
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set forwarding policy. This way, at a given Pub/Sub 
roker, the mixed key indices of every CHB is projected by the projected lattice 
l is used as a stamp in every CHB to SE message, every 
E to Pub/Sub Broker message, and every Pub/Sub Broker to Pub/Sub Broker 
me
 
 
crypted 
ted by a 
 event 
 
d their 
encry oset 
After updating the relevant lattice of mixed key indices, the SE, as a Pub/Sub 
broker, forwards the received mixed key index to a neighbour Pub/Sub broker 
only and only if a covering mixed key index was not forwarded to it before, 
which is a typical po
b
of mixed key indices.  
 
At a Pub/Sub broker, the associated projected lattice of mixed key indices with a 
given CHB is uniquely identified from other projected lattices of mixed key 
indices at this Pub/Sub broker by a unique CHB label. This label is agreed by 
all members of the trusted core. The unique CHB label is also used inside each 
CHB to discriminate the synchronized copies of posets and poset based key 
lattices of different members of the trusted core. 
 
The unique CHB labe
S
ssage, so that the receiver SE or Pub/Sub Broker can discriminate which 
projected lattice of mixed key indices it will operate on, e.g. for updating with a
received key index or for matching against a received encrypted event. 
Handling Publications at Entrusted Brokers 
In the second case, i.e., an authorized publisher, the UE sends an en
event to the subscription to the CHB via the SE. The event is encryp
shared secret only by the UE and the CHB. Then, the CHB matches the
against all the poset instances it has, i.e. its own poset and the synchronized 
copies the posets of other members of the trusted core. This type of matching 
events is very similar to a proposal of matching events at the Pub/Sub network 
edge, i.e. early matching [40]. 
In turn, the CHB returns a set of encrypted copies of the event an
associated mixed key indices to the SE. The event is encrypted using the 
ption key of every last matched node in every branch in every p
Chapter 5                                                                Conclusion and Future Work 
  127
 is sent along with the unique CHB 
on key index members with the mixed key index of the being 
encrypted event, and its mixed 
instance. Every encrypted copy of the event
label of the poset base key lattice which was used for encryption.  
 
Finally, the SE uses the returned mixed key indices and unique CHB labels to 
match the encrypted events against its own instances of projected lattices of 
mixed key indices. The matching is done by traversing a projected lattice of 
mixed key indices in a top-down approach, where a matched node is a node with 
any comm
matched encrypted key. Upon forwarding the 
key index and unique CHB label, to a subscriber Pub/Sub broker, this key index 
base matching operation is repeated. This process defines our future work of 
secure content based event routing. 
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